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Abstract 
We experience affect—emotions and mood—not only when we are awake but also 
during dreaming. Despite considerable research, existing theories and empirical 
findings disagree about the frequency, nature, and correlates of dream affect. In this 
thesis, I discuss the conceptual and methodological issues that underlie these 
discrepancies. I present five empirical studies, the overall aim of which was to 
investigate the phenomenology and correlates of dream affect and how results 
regarding these are influenced by study methodology. Studies I–III focused 
specifically on methodological issues, by comparing self- and external ratings of 
dream affect (Studies I–II) or the affective content of home and laboratory dream 
reports (Study III). Studies IV and V investigated the waking well-being and neural 
correlates of dream affect, respectively. These studies show that results and 
conclusions regarding dream affect are very different, even contradictory, depending 
on whether dream reports have been collected using sleep laboratory awakenings or 
home dream diaries (Study III) or whether dream affect has been measured using 
self- or external ratings (Studies I–II). Self- and external ratings of dream affect are 
also differently correlated with waking well-being (Study IV). Together, these 
results caution against making broad generalizations about affective dream 
experiences from findings obtained with one type of methodology only. The studies 
also demonstrate that dream affect is related to aspects of waking well-being and ill-
being (Study IV) and that certain affective states experienced in dreams, specifically 
anger, rely on similar neural processes as in wakefulness (Study V). These findings 
suggest that the phenomenology and neural correlates of affective experiences are, 
at least to some extent, continuous across sleep and wakefulness. Overall, this thesis 
shows how the conceptual and methodological issues in the study of dream affect 
may limit the validity, generalizability, and replicability of findings and, 
consequently, pose challenges to theory building and theory testing. It contributes to 
dream research by highlighting the need, and suggesting ways, to enhance the 
conceptual clarity and methodological rigour of research on dream affect. Due to the 
interdisciplinary nature of the thesis, the theoretical discussion and novel empirical 
findings also have implications for emotion research, sleep research, well-being 
research, consciousness research, and affective neuroscience.   
KEYWORDS: dreaming, affect, emotions, self-ratings, external ratings, REM sleep, 
well-being, peace of mind, frontal alpha asymmetry
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Tiivistelmä 
Koemme tunnetiloja – tunteita ja mielialoja – sekä valvetilassa että unennäön aikana. 
Tämän väitöskirjan tavoitteena on selvittää, miksi unissa esiintyviä tunnetiloja 
koskevat teoriat ja aikaisemmat tutkimustulokset ovat ristiriitaisia. Väitöskirjan 
tutkimuksissa analysoidaan erityisesti erilaisten käsitteellisten määritelmien sekä 
erilaisten aineistonkeruu- ja analyysimenetelmien vaikutusta unennäön tunnetiloista 
saatuihin tuloksiin. Väitöskirja koostuu viidestä osatyöstä, joiden tarkoituksena oli 
selvittää unissa esiintyvien tunnetilojen yleisyyttä, luonnetta ja hermostollisia 
vastineita sekä tarkastella erilaisten tutkimusmenetelmävalintojen vaikutusta tuloksiin. 
Tutkimuksissa I–III keskityttiin menetelmävalintojen vaikutuksiin: Tutkimuksissa I–
II vertailtiin itsearviointien ja ulkoisten arviointien vaikutusta unien 
tunnesisältötuloksiin, kun taas tutkimuksessa III tarkasteltiin tutkimusympäristön, 
jossa uniraportit kerättiin, vaikutusta unien tunnesisältötuloksiin. Tutkimuksessa IV 
keskityttiin unissa esiintyvien tunteiden ja hyvinvoinnin väliseen suhteeseen ja 
tutkimuksessa V unien tunnetilojen hermostollisiin korrelaatteihin. Tutkimukset I–III 
osoittavat, että tulokset ja johtopäätökset ovat huomattavan erilaisia, jopa ristiriitaisia, 
riippuen siitä, onko unien tunnetilat arvioinut unennäkijä itse vai ulkoinen arvioija 
(tutkimukset I–II) ja onko unet raportoitu kotona vai unilaboratoriossa (tutkimus III). 
Tutkimus IV paljasti unissa koettujen tunnetilojen olevan yhteydessä valveilla 
koettuun hyvinvointiin ja tutkimus V osoitti, että unissa ja valveilla koetut tunnetilat, 
erityisesti vihaisuuden tunne, perustuvat samanlaisiin hermostollisiin prosesseihin. 
Väitöskirjan tulokset osoittavat, että unissa esiintyviä tunnetiloja koskevat tutkimukset 
eivät ole aikaisemmin tuottaneet yhteneviä tuloksia ilmeisesti siksi, että eri 
tutkimuksissa on käytetty erilaisia käsitteellisiä määritelmiä sekä erilaisia 
aineistonkeruu- ja analyysimenetelmiä. Erilaiset määritelmät ja tutkimusmenetelmät 
väistämättä johtavat epäyhtenäisiin tutkimustuloksiin. Täten yksittäisten tutkimusten 
yleistettävyys ja toistettavuus on hyvin rajallista, eikä niiden perusteella ole 
mahdollista kehittää tai luotettavasti testata teorioita unennäön aikaisista tunnetiloista. 
Tämä väitöskirja edistää unennäön tunnetilojen tieteellistä tutkimusta osoittamalla, 
että tutkimusalueen käsitteellistä ja menetelmällistä perustaa on huomattavasti 
selkeytettävä, jotta tutkimukset tuottaisivat luotettavia, yleistettäviä ja yhteneviä 
tuloksia. Väitöskirjassa esitetään useita konkreettisia ehdotuksia, miten 
tutkimusaluetta olisi tähän suuntaan kehitettävä. Väitöskirjan tulokset ja 
johtopäätökset eivät rajoitu koskemaan pelkästään unennäön tutkimusta, vaan ovat 
merkityksellisiä myös laajemmin tajunnantutkimuksessa, subjektiivisen hyvinvoinnin 
tutkimuksessa ja tunnetilojen biologista perustaa tutkivassa neurotieteessä.   
ASIASANAT: unennäkö, tunnetilat, tunteet, itsearvio, ulkoinen arvio, REM uni, 
hyvinvointi, mielenrauha, frontaalinen alfa-asymmetria 
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I was standing next to a small propeller airplane waiting for someone to arrive, a 
bit worried that the plane might take off without me. Suddenly, the plane started to 
move, and I yelled to the pilot that he should wait for me. I took my handbag and sat 
next to the pilot. The plane started to take off. Then, I realized that there were cracks 
in the window next to me, and I was worried that it might break and the air pressure 
could suck me out. Slimy mud was already squeezing inside through the cracks and 
staining my white bag and pants. At the same time, I was excited to fly. The pilot told 
me that there was nothing to worry about. The nose of the airplane turned upwards, 
and I was surprised at how strong the pressure felt on my face. Once we had gained 
altitude, we started flying around. At one moment, the plane did a few full loops, 
which was scary. I closed my eyes, but also couldn’t resist looking, so I peeked and 
saw that everything was indeed upside down. Then, we flew around the world, and I 
could see all the oceans and landscapes below. Everything was very beautiful…blue 
transparent water…lush green plants…I even saw two small tiger cubs playing down 
in the grass. I observed and found them fascinating. At one point, I saw the world 
map and how the plane was moving from one continent to the next. Then, I was back 
on the plane again looking at the world below. It was amazing. I was so excited 
about this experience that I wanted to remember this dream. So, I thought I should 
tell it to someone in order to not forget it. Suddenly, I was in the university. A new 
research student from Estonia was on a research visit. She was sitting at a desk and 
I started to tell her my dream…how I was flying around. I had to hurry up. A machine 
behind her back was printing out some brain imaging results, and I knew that I had 
to finish telling the dream before the machine finished the analyses. Then, I asked 
the student what she is studying. And she said that she is doing research on the EEG 
of dream emotions. I got excited and said that this is what I am also interested in, 
that I am doing a Ph.D. on dream emotions, and that when she goes to the laboratory 
to collect data, I would come along. 
(Author, 4th May 2019) 
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1. Introduction 
Most of us know what it is like to dream. It is estimated that during our lifetimes, we 
spend at least six years dreaming, with most people having dreams every night. As 
in our waking lives, we experience a wide range of affective states—emotions and 
moods—in our dreams. We feel anxiety and fear, joy and excitement, anger and 
interest, even awe. 
Why we have such experiences while sleeping is a mystery that has puzzled 
humans since ancient times. Although contemporary dream theories disagree about 
the possible functions of dreams, most acknowledge the importance and centrality 
of affect in our dreams. Some even go so far as to claim that affect drives the content 
of dreams (Hartmann, 1996; Hobson, Pace-Schott, & Stickgold, 2000).  
Modern dream research dates back more than 160 years (Schwartz, 2000). Yet, 
many unresolved and contested questions remain regarding the affective nature of 
our dreams. Are dreams primarily affective, or are they mostly non-affective? Are 
dreams mostly negative or positive, or is the affective tone rather balanced? Do 
certain types of affective states, such as fear, dominate in dreams? Do the emotions 
and moods we experience in our dreams reflect our waking well-being? What are the 
neural correlates of dream affect? Do affective experiences in dreams and 
wakefulness rely on similar or different neural processes?  
Empirical studies have produced inconsistent—and even outright 
controversial—results regarding the phenomenology of dream affect. At the heart of 
the inconsistencies lie conceptual and methodological issues. The phenomenon—
dream affect—lacks clear and agreed-upon definitions, and there have been 
methodological discrepancies in how it has been measured: for example, whether 
self- or external ratings of affect have been used, and whether the data have been 
collected in the home or sleep laboratory environment. All of this has complicated 
the discovery of the waking and neural correlates of dream affect.  
The various conceptual and methodological issues in the study of dream affect 
have received little attention. This is surprising, given that how we define and 
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measure the phenomenon of interest determines the data we get. The fact that 
theories are built and tested based on these data places conceptualization and 
measurement at the centre of the scientific process. Put simply, to understand why 
we have (affective) dream experiences, we must know what these experiences are 
like, which in turn depends on how we study these. Thus, addressing conceptual and 
methodological issues is a crucial step towards resolving the controversies regarding 
the phenomenology and correlates of dream affect.  
Therefore, in this thesis, my overarching theoretical aim is to address the 
questions above through a conceptual and methodological lens, that is, to discuss the 
conceptual and methodological issues underlying discrepant empirical findings and 
theoretical conclusions regarding the phenomenology and correlates of dream affect. 
To achieve this aim, I use an interdisciplinary framework integrating different 
scientific fields—such as psychology, philosophy, and (affective) neuroscience—
and research areas, including dream research, sleep research, emotion research, 
consciousness research, and well-being research. The thesis builds on five empirical 
studies and one theoretical publication. The overall aim of the empirical studies was 
to investigate the phenomenology and correlates of dream affect and how results 
regarding these are influenced by study methodology. Studies I–III focused 
specifically on methodological issues, by comparing self- and external ratings of 
dream affect (Studies I and II) or by comparing the affective content of home and 
laboratory dream reports (Study III). Studies IV and V investigated the waking well-
being and neural correlates of dream affect, respectively.  
As such, this thesis, and the studies thereof, have important theoretical, 
empirical, methodological, and clinical implications. It not only helps to explain why 
such vast divides exist between various theories and empirical findings regarding 
dream affect but also provides crucial new insights regarding the phenomenology 
and correlates of dream affect. By highlighting the conceptual and methodological 
limitations in the scientific research on dream affect and proposing recommendations 
for how to tackle these, this thesis helps pave the way for more theoretically informed 
and methodologically rigorous research practices. The latter is particularly timely in 
light of the ‘replication crisis’ (Open Science Collaboration, 2015) and ‘validation 
crisis’ (Schimmack, 2019) and the ensuing focus on methodological issues in the 
field of psychology in general. Finally, a better understanding of the nature and 
correlates of dream affect may help in the development of diagnostic and prognostic 
markers, as well as interventions for enhancing the mental health of individuals. 
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2. Conceptual foundation 
Any scientific endeavour begins with the identification of what it is that we wish to 
understand. Therefore, the first task is to define the phenomenon or construct under 
investigation. Definitions are important because they determine what is measured, 
how it is measured, and, ultimately, what kind of results are obtained. Definitions 
also enable communication and shared understanding among researchers: they help 
ensure that we are discussing and comparing the same phenomenon.  
In this chapter, I define the phenomenon central to this thesis—dream affect. To 
do so, several other questions must be answered along the way: What is 
consciousness? What is a dream? What is affect?  
2.1 What is consciousness? 
In every moment of our lives, we experience something: we may perceive sights or 
sounds; feel emotions or physical sensations; remember, imagine, or think about 
something. This ‘stream of consciousness’, as William James (1890/1950) described 
it, is present not only when we are awake but also when we are asleep. We seem to 
be void of any experiences only under specific circumstances, such as during deep 
non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep, under anaesthesia6, or as a result of certain 
physiological conditions (e.g., during epileptic seizures). 
Our experiences have a particular phenomenal quality—it feels like something 
to have these experiences. This is why philosophers and consciousness researchers 
call the presence of subjective experiences phenomenal consciousness. At any given 
moment, we have a specific pattern of experiences, and this forms the contents of 
our phenomenal consciousness (Revonsuo, 2006). To be able to have any 
experiences at all, we must be in a state of consciousness—a state of certain 
 
6 However, evidence exists that subjective experiences can also occur during NREM sleep 
(e.g., Nielsen, 2000; Siclari, Bernardi, Cataldi, & Tononi, 2018) and anaesthesia (e.g., 
Noreika et al., 2011; Radek et al., 2018).  
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background mechanisms or conditions that allow phenomenal consciousness to 
appear (Revonsuo, 2010). In a non-conscious state, a person is unable to have any 
experiences whatsoever.  
A state of consciousness should be distinguished from the behavioural state, 
characterized by the level of wakefulness and the level of responsiveness. 
Wakefulness refers to the level of neurophysiological arousal, ranging from being 
fully awake, to sleep, to coma (Blumenfeld, 2016; Laureys, 2005). Responsiveness 
refers to whether and how a person behaves in response to external stimulation 
(Mashour & LaRock, 2008). Although the presence of subjective experiences is 
typically associated with wakefulness and responsiveness, a person can have a high 
level of wakefulness without any experiences (as in the vegetative state, now termed 
the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome; Laureys et al., 2010) or have experiences 
without being awake and responsive (as when dreaming during sleep).  
Our experiences are subjective—only we know ‘what it is like’ to have them 
(Nagel, 1974). The only way that other people can know if we are conscious—and 
what kind of conscious experiences we are having—is if we somehow communicate 
it to them. For this, we use reflective consciousness: we focus our spotlight of 
attention on some specific content of our phenomenal consciousness, reflect on it 
(e.g., by observing, labelling, categorizing), and then describe this experience to 
another using, for example, a verbal report (Revonsuo, 2006). Thus, we translate our 
actual raw experiences (phenomenal consciousness) into a self-report using higher-
level cognitive processes (reflective consciousness) (see Figure 1). Although the 
report reflects our experiences, it should not be identified with the experiences. 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between phenomenal and reflective consciousness. Phenomenal 
consciousness (A) contains different kinds of contents of consciousness. Reflective 
consciousness (B) is needed to be able to communicate the contents to others: we focus our 
spotlight of attention on some specific content, reflect on it (i.e., observe, label, categorize), 
and then translate this into a (verbal) self-report (C).  
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2.2 What is a dream? 
When asked “Did you have a dream last night?” or “What were you dreaming last 
night?”, people usually have no difficulties in understanding what is meant by the 
words dream and dreaming and, hence, answering those questions. However, it has 
proven a difficult endeavour to provide commonly accepted scientific definitions for 
these terms (Pagel et al., 2001).  
From a philosophical perspective, dreaming refers to the process of having 
subjective experiences, and a dream is a particular pattern of subjective experience 
(Revonsuo, 2006; Sikka, Pesonen, & Revonsuo, 2018). Thus, dreaming is a form of 
phenomenal consciousness, and dream content forms the contents of our phenomenal 
consciousness. Different from waking experiences, which occur during wakefulness, 
dream experiences occur during sleep7. Also, unlike waking experiences, dream 
experiences are mostly disconnected from the surrounding external environment8 
and behavioural activity 9  (Revonsuo, 2006; Windt, 2010, 2015, 2017). During 
dreaming, we often experience a hallucinatory world, where various events happen 
in which we play an active role, while we are actually lying in bed, nearly motionless. 
Dream experiences misrepresent reality, because the neurocognitive mechanisms 
producing subjective experiences during dreaming are altered. Thus, the dreaming 
state constitutes an altered state of consciousness (Revonsuo, Kallio, & Sikka, 2009). 
Although dream experiences misrepresent reality at the time of occurrence, they are 
nevertheless considered to be realistic offline simulations of the waking world 
(Foulkes, 1985; Nielsen, 2010; Revonsuo, Tuominen, & Valli, 2016a; Snyder, 
1970). 
Whereas much of the philosophical and empirical literature converges in 
defining dreams as subjective experiences (Revonsuo, 2006; Windt, 2013, 2015; 
Windt & Metzinger, 2007), there is less consensus regarding what types of subjective 
experiences count as dreams—all, or only some, kinds of experiences (Zadra & 
Domhoff, 2017). The subjective experiences that occur during sleep are highly 
varied and can best be characterized as lying along a continuum: from simple and 
static experiences (fragmentary, unisensory percepts, such as images, sounds, bodily 
sensations, and thoughts) to complex and dynamic experiences (immersive, 
 
7 Some researchers argue that dreams can also occur outside sleep, for example, during mind-
wandering (Domhoff & Fox, 2015; Windt, 2010).  
8 Occasionally, experimental stimulation can influence the content of dreams (for a review, 
see Schredl, 2018). 
9  However, individuals with REM sleep behaviour disorder may ‘act out’ their dream 
experiences (e.g., Comella, Nardine, Diederich, & Stebbins, 1998; Oudiette et al., 2009). 
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multisensory, and story-like hallucinations) (Revonsuo, 2006, 2010; Windt, 2010, 
2015). In broader and more inclusive conceptualizations, any subjective experiences 
occurring during sleep, be they simple or more complex, are considered dreams (see 
A in Figure 2; e.g., Flanagan, 2001). In narrower and more restrictive 
conceptualizations, only the more complex and dynamic experiences are considered 
dreams (see C in Figure 2; e.g., Hobson et al., 2000), whereas the simpler experiences 
are considered dreamless sleep experiences (e.g., Windt, Nielsen, & Thompson, 
2016) or sleep mentation10 (Revonsuo, 2006) (see B in Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. The continuum of subjective experiences during sleep and the broader (A) and 
narrower (C) definitions of dream and dreaming. Adapted from Sikka, 2019, p.154. 
Regarding the narrower conceptualizations, dreaming has been defined as “…a 
multimodal, complex, dynamic world-simulation in consciousness during sleep” 
(Revonsuo et al., 2016a, p. 5). However, in such conceptualizations, it remains 
unclear exactly what demarcates dream experiences from dreamless experiences, or 
precisely where along the continuum we should draw a line between these different 
types of experiences. To address this problem, Windt (2010, 2015) has provided 
minimal requirements that an experience should include to be considered a dream: 
dreams are immersive spatiotemporal hallucinations occurring in sleep or sleep–
wake transitions. Hence, what differentiates dreams from other types of subjective 
experiences during sleep is having the experience of being spatially and temporally 
present or immersed in the dream.  
Despite progress in the development of a more precise conceptual definition of 
dreaming and dreams, a clear and agreed-upon operational definition distinguishing 
dreams from dreamless sleep experiences is lacking. Thus, even if conceptual 
differences between the different types of subjective experiences during sleep are 
 
10 Some researchers use the term sleep mentation to refer to all kinds of experiences occurring 
during sleep—subjective experiences in general (e.g., Stickgold, 2017).  
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theoretically recognized, they are rarely addressed empirically. In fact, it is not 
uncommon for empirical papers to define dreaming in the narrower sense but to 
operationally consider all reports of subjective experiences occurring during sleep as 
dreams. As a result, empirical literature typically follows the broader and more 
inclusive conceptualization of dreams and dreaming.  
In the present thesis—and in the studies it consists of—I use the broader 
definition and thus consider all subjective experiences occurring during sleep as 
dreams and the process of having these experiences as dreaming.  
2.3 What is affect? 
In the title of a landmark article in 1884, William James famously asked, “What is 
an Emotion?” Fast forward a century, and emotion researchers confessed, “Everyone 
knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition. Then, it seems, no one 
knows” (Fehr & Russell, 1984, p. 464). Another three decades later, the situation can 
best be described as follows: everyone knows what an emotion is, but few agree. As 
with the concepts of dream and dreaming, the task of defining the concept of affect—
and related concepts such as emotion and mood—is not an easy one, due to fervent 
conceptual and theoretical disagreements in the field of emotion research. 
Regardless, in what follows, I try to provide a concise synthesis of the relevant 
concepts and their interrelations.  
2.3.1 Affect: A conceptual map  
Affect is typically used as an umbrella term referring to various affective or valenced 
phenomena, such as emotions and moods (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008; Scherer, 2005). 
It is important to distinguish affective states (i.e., state affect) from affective traits 
(i.e., trait affect). The latter are individual dispositions, or the tendency to experience 
some types of affective states more frequently or more likely than other types of 
affective states (Scherer, 2005). Thus, whereas affective states are relatively short-
term and transient phenomena, affective traits are long-term and rather stable 
phenomena (Watson, 2000) (see Figure 3).  
Different affective states—emotions and moods—are also distinguished based 
on their duration, although this is not the only differentiating feature. Despite the 
multitude of different conceptualizations (Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981), it is 
generally agreed that emotion is a short-lived and intense affective response to 
specific, important events or stimuli occurring in the external (i.e., outside the 
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individual) or internal (i.e., inside the individual, such as thoughts) environment 
(Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008; Scherer, 2005). Mood lasts longer and is typically more 
diffuse, of low intensity, and often difficult to link to a specific event (Frijda, 2009; 
Gross, 1998, 2015; Scherer, 2005; see also Figure 5).  
For example, a person with high trait anxiety (affective trait) may often 
experience anxiety without any apparent cause (affective state: mood), whereas a 
person with low trait anxiety (affective trait) is more likely to feel relatively calm 
most of the time (affective state: mood). In response to a challenging or potentially 
dangerous situation, both may experience fear (affective state: emotion) that subsides 
once the challenge is perceived to be over, although a person with high trait anxiety 
may be more likely to feel fear, experience it more intensely, and take longer to 
return to his or her baseline level of affectivity.  
Affective states—emotions and moods—are subjective experiences; it feels like 
something for the person to experience anxiety or fear. Thus, affective states are 
particular contents of phenomenal consciousness, which are arguably different from 
non-affective states (Reisenzein & Döring, 2009). This special phenomenal quality 
was emphasized early on by William James (1890/1950) and the founder of 
experimental psychology, Wilhelm Wundt (1896/1897).  
However, it is important to note that in addition to the conscious subjective 
experience (e.g., feeling afraid), emotion is considered to also consist of other 
components, including (1) the motor expression component (facial and vocal 
expression, e.g., looking scared); (2) the neurophysiological component (autonomic 
arousal, e.g., heart beating faster); (3) the motivational component (action tendency, 
e.g., wanting to escape); (4) the cognitive component (appraisal, e.g., evaluating how 
threatening the situation is); and (5) the regulation component (affect regulation, e.g., 
down-regulating the experience of fear or suppressing the urge to escape), although 
debate is ongoing regarding whether the latter two components should be considered 
part of emotion as such (Gross, 1998, 2015; Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008; Sander, 2013; 
Scherer, 2005). The subjective conscious experience of emotion integrates all of the 
other components and may reflect some or all of them (Scherer, 2005). Although the 
different components are generally discussed only with regard to emotion, moods 
arguably also consist of other, non-conscious components.  
Several different terms are used to refer to the subjective experience of emotion: 
emotion(al) experience (Lambie & Marcel, 2002; Scherer, 2005), emotional feeling 
(LeDoux & Brown, 2017; Panksepp, 1998), feeling of emotion (Damasio, 2000), or 
feeling (Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2018). Although emotions and moods are 
considered conceptually distinct, operationally they are often confounded with each 
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other. This means that in the empirical emotion literature, the various terms 
mentioned above pertain not only to the subjective experience of emotion but also to 
the subjective experience of mood. In fact, the term feeling is frequently defined as 
the subjective experience of emotion and/or mood (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008). This is 
what is measured via self-reports, when we ask an individual, “how are you feeling?” 
However, feeling is also used to refer to the perception of physiological or bodily 
sensations (Pace-Schott et al., 2019). Therefore, given these inconsistencies and 
ambiguities, when the subjective experience of emotion and mood are not 
distinguished, I consider it more accurate to use the term affective experience (or 
affective feeling) (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Conceptual map of affect. Shadowed area refers to affective experience (i.e., 
affective feeling)—the conscious subjective experience of affective states. 
2.3.2 Models of affect 
Another issue related to the conceptualization of affect pertains to the structure of 
affect, that is, what the basic building blocks of different affective states are and what 
distinguishes them from each other. Different models of affect have fundamentally 
different assumptions (see Sander et al., 2018 for a review; Siegel et al., 2018). 
Models of discrete affect, more commonly referred to as models of basic emotions 
(e.g., Ekman, 1970, 1972, 1992; Izard, 1971, 1992; Panksepp, 1998; Tomkins, 1962, 
1984), originate from the observations of Charles Darwin (1872). According to these 
models, there is a limited number of discrete affects or discrete affect categories, 
such as anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and happiness, that are universal—shared in 
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different cultures (Ekman, 1970, 1972, 1992) and mammals (Panksepp, 1998). How 
many and which categories exist is debated. However, each discrete affect category 
is considered to have a distinct psychological, behavioural, and neurobiological 
‘fingerprint’ (in terms of autonomic or brain activity) that differentiates it from other 
affect categories (Siegel et al., 2018). Similarly, each discrete affect category feels 
different—for example, fear is experienced qualitatively differently from anger—
and individuals use words such as “angry” or “afraid” to describe these subjective 
experiences. 
In contrast, according to the dimensional models of affect, all affective states 
arise from combinations of more fundamental affective dimensions. This idea dates 
back to Spencer (1855) and Wundt (1896/1897). Again, there is some disagreement 
over how many and which dimensions exist, but the dimensions of valence (positive 
vs negative, pleasure vs displeasure), arousal (arousal vs non-arousal, activation vs 
deactivation), and motivational direction (approach vs avoidance/withdrawal) are 
among the most frequently used (e.g., Davidson, 1992; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
1990; Larsen & Diener, 1992; Russell, 1980). The dimensions can be bipolar (e.g., 
pleasant–unpleasant, activation–deactivation; Barrett & Russell, 1999) or unipolar 
(e.g., positive activation, negative activation; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), depending 
on whether the endpoints of dimensions are considered related or independent. 
According to dimensional models, common overlapping neurobiological systems 
reflecting these dimensions, such as valence and arousal, underlie all affective states 
(Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005).  
Modern constructivist theories build on the dimensional models. Russell and 
Barrett (1999) call the subjective experience of bodily (neurophysiological) changes 
associated with fundamental affective dimensions core affect. According to Barrett 
(2006, 2017), we experience core affect—to what extent something feels pleasant 
versus unpleasant, activating versus deactivating—and use concepts to categorize 
our experiences into a particular emotion category (e.g., whether this particular 
experience is anger or fear) depending on the context or situation. In fact, Barrett 
reserves the term emotion for the subjective experience—“the experience of feeling 
an emotion”—which happens as a result of conceptual categorization (2006, p. 27). 
From this perspective, there is no unique physiological or neurobiological pattern 
characteristic to an emotion as such, only to core affect (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, 
Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012). Thus, core affect forms the basic building block of 
the subjective experience of emotion and mood.  
Discrete and dimensional models of affect are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. The circumplex models of affect combine affective dimensions with 
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discrete affect categories: different discrete affective states arise as combinations of 
more fundamental affective dimensions (e.g., Yik, Russell, & Steiger, 2011). For 
example, fear is considered a combination of negative valence and high arousal.  
As discussed below, which conceptual model of emotion is used has direct 
implications for the measurement of affective experiences and their neural correlates. 
2.4 What is dream affect? 
The preceding sections have revealed a conceptual and terminological tangle 
involving the concepts of dream and affect. It is not surprising, then, that there is no 
agreed-upon definition for dream affect. In empirical dream research, as in emotion 
research, conceptual distinctions between the different types of affective states are 
typically not acknowledged. As a result, the terms affect, emotion, mood, and feeling 
are used interchangeably, although the term emotion occurs most frequently. In fact, 
often the different types of affective phenomena—state affect (i.e., affect 
experienced in dreams) and trait affect (i.e., the general tendency to experience 
certain affective states in one’s dreams)—are not distinguished, and one is used to 
draw conclusions about the other. Also, the reason for using a particular model of 
affect—discrete or dimensional—is seldom explained.  
In this thesis, by bringing together the consciousness, dream, and emotion 
literatures—and following from the conceptual map laid out previously—I use the 
following working definition: dream affect refers to affective experiences—the 
subjective experience of affective states, such as emotions and moods (i.e., affective 
feelings)—that occur during dreaming. Hence, dream affect constitutes particular 
contents of phenomenal consciousness during sleep—the affective contents of 
dreams. When referring to affective dispositions, I use the term affective trait (or 
trait affect). Such a conceptualization was also used in the original Publications IV 
and V. It should be noted, however, that in the original Publications I–III and VI, the 
term emotion was used as a synonym for affective experiences.  
Regarding the theoretical model of affect, I have not strongly committed to either 
the discrete or the dimensional approach. Due to the lack of consensus and clear 
empirical support in favour of one model over the other, an approach integrating both 
seems to be the most fruitful. When discrete affective states are measured, it is 
possible to categorize them into dimensions post hoc, whereas the opposite is not 
possible. For this reason, in the empirical studies conducted in the framework of this 
thesis, the model of discrete affect was used for the measurement of affect, which 
enabled the analysis of both discrete and dimensional affect.  
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3. Methodological foundation 
Once the phenomenon of interest has been adequately defined, the next challenge is 
to determine how best to measure it. For our measurements to be useful, the methods 
for collecting and analysing data must be valid (i.e., they should measure what we 
intend to measure as accurately and precisely as possible) and reliable (i.e., they 
should produce consistent results). Reliability enables replicability (i.e., consistent 
results across different studies), but replicable results are only valuable if they are 
valid.  
In this chapter, I focus on the methods used to study dream affect. First, I discuss 
issues related to the measurement of dream experiences in general: what kind of data 
we can access to study dream experiences, including dream affect. Next, I describe 
various methodological aspects and decisions involved when collecting and 
analysing such data. Finally, I describe the most common methods used to study 
dream affect and discuss their strengths and weaknesses.  
3.1 How dream experiences are studied: From 
experiences to retrospective self-reports  
As discussed in the previous chapter, dreams are subjective experiences. Hence, only 
the person experiencing dreams has direct access to them. We, as researchers, can 
observe and measure the behavioural state—sleep—but we have no objective or 
third-person methods to observe and measure dream experiences (or any other 
subjective experiences, for that matter) as they are happening11. Even the most 
 
11 Progress has been made in detecting signs of consciousness in patients diagnosed with 
various disorders of consciousness, such as the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome. 
However, despite promising developments, the methods are not based on detecting 
phenomenal experiences as such but rather rely on the preserved ability of the patients to 
intentionally and consistently engage in specific imagery and in measuring the corresponding 
brain activity (Gosseries, Laureys, & Schnakers, 2019).  
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modern brain imaging techniques, which measure brain activity while a person is 
dreaming, ultimately rely on subjective reports or self-reports given by the person 
upon awakening from sleep. These are used to confirm whether the person was, in 
fact, experiencing a dream, and what he or she was dreaming about (e.g., Horikawa, 
Tamaki, Miyawaki, & Kamitani, 2013; Siclari et al., 2017). Similarly, although lucid 
dreamers are often able to report aspects of their dream experiences to researchers 
while dreaming (for example, by signalling with their eyes according to a 
predetermined pattern; e.g., LaBerge, Baird, & Zimbardo, 2018), these experiences 
must be verified by self-reports provided upon awakening. Thus, self-reports are the 
only means, at least to date, to obtain information about dream experiences, 
including affective dream experiences.  
However, important differences exist between dream experiences and self-
reports regarding these experiences. Whereas dream experiences occur in 
phenomenal consciousness, self-reports depend on reflective consciousness (see 
Section 2.1). Moreover, self-reports of dream experiences rely on what the person 
remembers about the experience. Thus, to get information about the dream 
experience, we depend on the episodic memories of the dream experience and on the 
self-reports of these memories (Domhoff, 2018; Sikka, 2019; Snyder, 1970; Zadra 
& Domhoff, 2017). In essence, then, we have different conscious selves: the self who 
experiences the dream (the experiencing self), the self who remembers the dream 
experience (the remembering self), and the self who reports the dream experience 
(the reporting self) (see Figure 4)12. Importantly, the process of transforming the 
experience into a self-report entails several potential pitfalls. First, attention is 
selective—we can only access part(s) of the experience (what we pay attention to), 
whereas the rest fades away. Second, memory is biased; we remember certain 
experiences better than others (Kensinger, 2009), and memory fades over time—
particularly when transitioning from one state to another (Goodenough, Witkin, 
Lewis, Koulack, & Cohen, 1974) or due to interference (Calkins, 1893; Cohen & 
Wolfe, 1973; Koulack & Goodenough, 1976; Parke & Horton, 2009)—and is 
influenced by whether we intend to remember something (Alger, Chen, & Payne, 
2019). Third, the process of reporting may be biased (see Sections 3.2.2.1 and 
3.2.2.2). Fourth, self-reports are provided in a different behavioural state 
(wakefulness) than that in which they were experienced (sleep). Fifth, self-reports 
 
12 The terms the experiencing self and the remembering self were introduced by Kahneman 
and Riis (2005) to refer to the momentary experience and evaluations based on the memories 
of those experiences, respectively. The term the remembering self has also been referred to 
as the extended self (Neisser, 1988) and the continuing me (Nelson, 2001).  
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(as well as our memories of our experiences) can be influenced by our waking beliefs 
or conceptual knowledge about ourselves (the believing self) (Conner & Barrett, 
2012; Robinson & Clore, 2002). As a result, we have access to a rather limited, and 
possibly biased, account of the experience, rather than to the actual ‘raw’ experience 
per se.  
 
Figure 4. The relationship between the dream experience (the experiencing self), memories 
of the dream experience (the remembering self), and self-reports (of the memories) of the 
dream experience (the reporting self). Waking beliefs about one’s dream experiences (the 
believing self) can influence both the remembering and reporting selves. Adapted from Sikka, 
2019, p. 154. 
In summary, to study the phenomenon of dream experience, data in the form of 
retrospective self-reports are collected. Empirical dream research is, hence, the study 
of remembered and reported dreams (Domhoff, 2018; Zadra & Domhoff, 2017), 
which are assumed to truthfully reflect the actual dream experiences, at least “when 
gathered under ideal reporting conditions” (Windt, 2015, p. 196; see Section 8.5.2).  
3.2 Methods for studying dream affect 
As in the study of other contents of dream experiences, dream affect is investigated 
by collecting and analysing retrospective self-reports. Self-reports of dream affect 
are thus indirect measures of, or proxies for, affective dream experiences. When 
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talking about results and conclusions regarding dream affect (i.e., affective dream 
experiences), as done in the current thesis, it is important to keep in mind that these 
are all based on retrospective self-reports.  
The assumption that retrospective self-reports reflect underlying affective dream 
experiences hinges on the rigour of study methodology. Studies vary widely in the 
methodology used for collecting and analysing data. Table 1 summarizes the various 
methodological aspects involved in the study of dream affect. Several aspects are 
common to the study of dream experiences in general (see Sections I and II in Table 
1; see also Kahan & Horton, 2012; Sikka, 2019; Stickgold, 2017; Windt, 2015; Zadra 
& Domhoff, 2017). Other aspects pertain specifically to the study of affective 
experiences (see Section III in Table 1; see also Ekkekakis, 2013; Larsen & 
Fredrickson, 1999). Results regarding the phenomenology (i.e., the frequency and 
nature) of dream affect depend on the decisions made regarding each of those 
aspects. 
One general methodological aspect involved in the collection of self-reports of 
dream experiences concerns who is studied, or whose self-reports are collected. In 
addition to various demographic characteristics (e.g., gender and age), several other 
individual differences may influence the quality of the data collected and the results 
obtained. Given that the collected data are necessarily retrospective, results may 
reflect individual differences in dream recall or memory abilities in general, rather 
than differences in dream phenomenology (Kahan & Claudatos, 2016; Kahan & 
Horton, 2012). Further individual differences that may influence results include 
participants’ introspection (or self-observation) and language skills, attention and 
metacognitive skills, motivation to take part in the study, beliefs about dreaming, 
interest in and attitudes towards dreams, and various personality traits (Kahan, 2012; 
Kahan & Horton, 2012; Schredl, 2018; Snyder, 1970). When studying dream affect, 
a number of affect-related abilities and traits—such as low affect differentiation or 
granularity (i.e., the inability to distinguish similar affective states from one another; 
Barrett, 2004; Erbas et al., 2019) and alexithymia (characterized by difficulty in 
identifying and describing affective states)—may compromise reports of affective 
experiences (Kashdan, Barrett, & McKnight, 2015). 
Other aspects common to the study of the different contents of dream 
experiences involve decisions regarding what types of self-reports are collected (e.g., 
narrative reports or targeted probes), as well as where (e.g., in the sleep laboratory 
or home environment), when (i.e., what the sampling procedure is), and how (e.g., 
which method of awakening is used) they are collected. Different types of self-
reports involve different reporting and response biases (see Sections 3.2.2.1 and 
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3.2.2.2). Depending on where, when, and how self-reports are collected, they may 
be more or less susceptible to memory biases and more or less generalizable across 
people, time, and settings.  
If narrative reports are collected, they must be content analysed to obtain 
quantitative data regarding the experiences described in the reports. Content analysis 
of narrative dream reports involves decisions as to who rates the reports (i.e., external 
judges or dreamer), how (e.g., instructions to raters), and with what method (e.g., 
type of scale) they are analysed. Different choices regarding each of these aspects 
can lead to different results. 
When specifically studying dream affect, a number of additional decisions must 
be made, such as what type of affective phenomenon (e.g., state or trait affect), 
affective experience (e.g., emotion or mood or affective states in general), and model 
of affect (e.g., discrete or dimensional or their combination) is investigated. A 
plethora of different affect rating scales and items can be used to collect (i.e., as 
targeted probes) and analyse (i.e., for content analysis of narrative reports) data, each 
with its own strengths and weaknesses (see e.g., Ekkekakis, 2013). When measuring 
discrete affect, one must choose whether to use standardized or unstandardized (i.e., 
ad hoc lists of items relevant for a particular study) scales, which particular affect 
items to measure, whether to include only high-arousal/activation states or also low-
arousal/activation states, and whether the number of positive and negative affect 
items is balanced. When measuring dimensional affect, decisions involve whether to 
use unipolar or bipolar and unidimensional or multi-dimensional scales. In addition, 
the particular response format of the scale (i.e., how many scale points it includes) 
may exert influence (Schimmack, Böckenholt, & Reisenzein, 2002). Last but not 
least, results may differ depending on which aspect of affect is measured: presence 
(whether affect is experienced or not), intensity (the strength with which affect is 
experienced), frequency (the number of times affect is experienced), or duration 
(how long the affective state lasts) (Diener, Larsen, Levine, & Emmons, 1985; 
Schimmack, Oishi, Diener, & Suh, 2000). For example, in the situation depicted in 
Figure 5, the measurement of the intensity of emotion would indicate that the person 
is experiencing more negative than positive emotions, whereas the measurement of 
the frequency of emotion would show that positive emotions prevail.  
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Table 1. Methodological aspects and decisions involved in the collection and analysis of 
retrospective self-reports of dream affect 
Methodological aspects Decisions to make Questions to consider 
I GENERAL ASPECTS: COLLECTION OF SELF-REPORTS 
WHO 
 
 
 
 
Sex/Gender Male/man 
Female/woman 
Other 
Are the data representative of 
the population or group of 
interest? 
Are the data influenced by 
other individual differences? 
 
 
Age group Children 
Adolescents 
Adults 
Culture Western 
Eastern 
Country/Society WEIRD 
Developing 
Third World 
Traditional indigenous  
Hunter-gatherer tribal  
Marital status Single 
In a relationship 
Married 
Divorced 
Widowed 
Occupational 
status 
Student 
Employed 
Non-employed 
Health status Healthy 
Clinically diagnosed 
Sample size 1 - … 
WHERE Environmental 
setting 
Sleep laboratory 
Home 
Other 
Are the data ecologically 
valid? 
WHAT Type of self-
report 
Narrative report 
Targeted probes 
Questionnaire 
Are the data influenced by 
reporting and response 
biases? 
Reporting 
modality 
Written 
Oral 
Other 
Are the data influenced by the 
reporting modality? 
WHEN Temporal lag Immediately upon 
awakening 
After delay 
Are the data influenced by 
memory biases? 
Time of night Early 
Middle 
Late 
Are the data representative of 
dream experiences across the 
whole night? 
Sleep stage REM 
NREM (N1, N2, N3) 
Time in sleep 
stage 
Fixed (minutes) 
Unspecified 
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HOW Method of 
awakening 
Induced 
Spontaneous 
Are the data influenced by 
memory biases? 
Experimental 
situation 
Participant monitored 
Participant not monitored 
Are the data influenced by 
reporting biases? 
Number of nights One 
Several 
Are the data representative of 
dream experiences across 
different nights? 
Number of dream 
reports 
One 
Several  
Are the data representative of 
the whole dream life of a 
participant? 
II GENERAL ASPECTS: CONTENT ANALYSIS OF NARRATIVE DREAM REPORTS 
WHO Rater External judges 
Dreamer 
 
WHAT Type of scale All vs specific contents 
Nominal vs ordinal  
 
Unit of analysis Dream report as a whole 
vs every event, episode, or 
time the specific contents 
occurred 
Are the data influenced by 
aggregation biases or the 
repetitive reporting of the 
same experience?  
HOW Instructions to 
raters 
Rating explicitly or 
implicitly expressed 
content 
Are the ratings reliable and 
reproducible? 
Controlling for 
report length 
Yes 
No 
Does report length reflect an 
inability to describe existing 
content, the amount of 
content, or individual 
differences in language use? 
III SPECIFIC ASPECTS: MEASUREMENT OF AFFECT 
WHAT 
 
 
 
Type of affective 
phenomenon 
State affect 
Trait affect 
Which construct is targeted? 
Type of affective 
experience 
Affect 
Emotion 
Mood 
Core affect 
 
Model of affect Discrete 
Dimensional 
Circumplex 
Which model is best suited for 
measuring the intended 
construct? 
Type of affect 
rating scale 
Discrete (e.g., fear, anger) 
Dimensional (e.g., positive 
affect, negative affect) 
Is there an empirically 
validated instrument that can 
be used? Which is the 
psychometrically strongest 
instrument? 
Aspect of affect Presence 
Frequency 
Intensity 
Duration 
 
Note. WEIRD = western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic; REM = rapid eye 
movement sleep; NREM = non-rapid eye movement sleep. Adapted from Sikka, 2019, pp. 
155-156.  
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Figure 5. Example displaying different types and aspects of affective experiences. Emotions 
are relatively short-lived and intense, whereas moods are longer lasting and less intense. 
Measurement of different aspects of affect, such as the presence (e.g., whether the emotion 
is experienced), frequency (e.g., how often the emotion is experienced), intensity (e.g., how 
strongly the emotion is experienced), and duration (e.g., how long the emotion lasts), yield 
different results. In the situation depicted in the figure, measuring the presence of emotions 
would show that both positive and negative emotions occur. Measuring the (mean) intensity 
of emotions would indicate that negative emotions dominate, whereas measuring the 
frequency and duration of emotions would show that positive emotions prevail. 
An important methodological aspect that applies to the study of dream 
experiences in general—and to the study of dream affect in particular—is the 
temporal lag between the experience and the self-report regarding that experience. 
Research on waking affect has demonstrated that our memories of affective 
experiences are distorted with respect to the actual experience, a phenomenon known 
as the memory–experience gap (Miron-Shatz, Stone, & Kahneman, 2009). 
Specifically, retrospective evaluations of affective experiences follow the peak-end 
rule—we remember the peak affective experience (e.g., the most positive or negative 
moment) and the end of the experience. This means that people select a 
representative moment (peak and/or end) and evaluate the whole experience based 
on it (Kahneman, 1999; Kahneman & Riis, 2005; cf. Miron-Shatz, 2009). 
Importantly, the longer the temporal delay from the experience (i.e., from the 
experiencing self), the more likely it is that the memories of our affective experiences 
(the remembering self) are biased (Kahneman & Riis, 2005; Robinson & Clore, 
2002). 
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Different methods for collecting and analysing self-reports of dream affect 
involve a different combination of the methodological aspects described in Table 1. 
Below, the most typical methods are described and their main strengths and 
weaknesses discussed. Although these methods are described from the perspective 
of the study of dream affect, they can also be used to study other types of contents 
of dream experiences.  
3.2.1 Typical methods for collecting retrospective self-reports of 
dream affect 
3.2.1.1  Sleep laboratory awakenings 
In the sleep laboratory, participants are monitored with polysomnography, which 
typically includes the measurement of brain electrical activity 
(electroencephaloraphy, EEG), eye movements (electrooculography, EOG), and 
muscle activity (electromyography, EMG). After participants have fallen asleep, 
researchers wake them up at a specific time of night, sleep stage, and time during 
sleep stage. The awakening schedule depends on the research question. Participants 
then provide a narrative (typically oral) dream report and/or rate the affect they 
experienced in the dream using targeted probes (e.g., affect rating scale). After this, 
participants are again allowed to fall asleep. Often, multiple awakenings are used in 
the laboratory, meaning that participants are awakened several times throughout the 
night (e.g., Foulkes, 1979). In other studies, participants can sleep through the night, 
and the reports and/or affect ratings are collected upon morning awakening (e.g., 
Weisz & Foulkes, 1970). 
Collection of data in the sleep laboratory is considered the ‘gold standard’ of 
dream research, because it is possible to control exactly when and how data are 
acquired (Schredl, 2018; Windt, 2015). Dream reports and affect ratings can be 
obtained immediately upon awakening, reducing the possible effects of memory 
biases. Because it is possible to collect data from different times of night, sleep 
stages, and times spent in each sleep stage, a more representative sample of dream 
experiences across the night can be achieved (Zadra & Domhoff, 2017).  
However, the laboratory setting and experimental situation—sleeping in a novel 
and atypical environment, being attached to equipment, and being closely monitored 
by the researchers—can influence dream content. In fact, as many as 20 % of dream 
reports collected in the laboratory have references to the laboratory environment 
(Schredl, 2008). If multiple awakenings are used, participants may get very tired due 
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to interrupted sleep or suffer from sleep inertia, which may affect the quality of 
narrative reports and bias ratings of dream affect (Zadra & Domhoff, 2017). All of 
these possible influences call into question the ecological validity of dream reports 
and affect ratings collected in the sleep laboratory.  
To reduce the possible effect of the novel and atypical sleeping environment, 
often, adaptation nights are performed or the first night removed from the analyses. 
Together with the fact that data collection in the sleep laboratory is a highly time- 
and resource-consuming endeavour, this means that laboratory studies usually 
involve only a few nights per participant. As a result, it is questionable whether the 
data collected in the laboratory are representative of the whole dream life of the 
participant (Sikka, 2019).  
3.2.1.2  Home dream diary 
The most widely used method for collecting data regarding dream experiences is the 
home dream diary. Participants sleep at home and are asked, immediately upon 
awakening, to write down (or audio record) their dream reports and/or rate the affect 
experienced in the preceding dream using targeted probes (e.g., affect rating scale). 
In the home environment sleep is typically not monitored, and therefore it is unclear 
when exactly the awakenings occur, although some studies have also used home-
based sleep recording equipment (e.g., Fosse, Stickgold, & Hobson, 2001; Okuma, 
Fukuma, & Kobayashi, 1975). 
Because participants sleep in a naturalistic environment, home dream diaries are 
ecologically valid. Assuming that participants diligently follow the instructions, it is 
possible to ensure a rather short temporal delay between a dream experience and its 
report/ratings. Because of the relative ease and low cost, home dream diaries can be 
obtained over a longer period. As a result, it is possible to collect more dream reports 
and affect ratings per person, which means that the data are more representative of 
the whole dream life of the participant. At the same time, longer data collection 
periods rely on participants’ motivation, which may wane over time and influence 
the quality of dream reports (e.g., participants may not be very accurate and detailed 
when reporting their dreams; Zadra & Robert, 2012).  
However, the main problem with home dream diaries is that because the 
sampling of the dream data is typically not controlled, the data reflect only a selective 
sample of the dream experiences. In fact, laboratory studies have shown that the most 
recent, affective, and longest dreams are remembered in the morning, with recency 
being the most crucial factor (Baekeland & Lasky, 1968; Meier, Ruef, Ziegler, & 
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Hall, 1968; Trinder & Kramer, 1971). Evidence also exists that dreams with more 
negative affect are more likely to be recalled in the morning (Goodenough et al., 
1974). Thus, because in the home environment dream reports and ratings mostly 
derive from morning awakenings, they likely reflect the most recent and most 
affective dream experiences of the night. 
3.2.1.3  Most recent dream 
Using the Most Recent Dream method, participants are asked to write down the most 
recent dream they can recall, “whether it was last night, last week, or last month” 
(Domhoff, 1996). This dream report is either content analysed as other narrative 
reports, or it can be accompanied with targeted probes about the affect experienced 
in the dream. With this method, it is easy to collect dream reports from a large 
number of participants, in either a classroom, other group setting, or via the Internet. 
However, because there is often a rather long delay from the actual dream experience 
(i.e., hours, days, weeks), memories of these experiences are likely to be distorted 
and influenced by waking beliefs (Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2015; Johnson, Kahan, 
& Raye, 1984). Memory biases are especially likely because participants are not 
instructed or trained in how to recall and report dreams, and they have not originally 
intended to remember and report them. In fact, instead of the most recent dream, 
participants may report a recurrent dream or the first dream that comes to mind. 
Moreover, since every participant reports only one dream, and it is unknown exactly 
when (sleep stage, time of night, time in sleep stage) it was experienced, the 
representativeness of the collected data is questionable. Thus, the Most Recent 
Dream likely reflects a very selective sample—the most salient (e.g., the most 
affective)—of dreams. This makes the method more suitable for studying other 
phenomena (e.g., the most memorable dreams), rather than affective dream 
experiences as such (Sikka, 2019).  
3.2.1.4  Dream questionnaire 
Dream questionnaires or surveys ask questions about one’s dream experiences in 
general, such as what the affective tone of one’s dreams is on average (e.g., the 
Mannheim Dream Questionnaire; Schredl, Berres, Klingauf, Schellhaas, & Göritz, 
2014). Questionnaires are easy to administer to large groups of participants, either 
in classroom settings or via the Internet. However, the longer the time delay from 
specific dream experiences and the more the respondents must aggregate their 
experiences over a long period (e.g., over a lifetime), the less likely it is that 
Pilleriin Sikka 
40 
questionnaires reflect memories of actual experiences. Rather, such questionnaires 
reflect respondents’ cognitive evaluations or beliefs about their dream lives 
(Sandman, 2017; Zadra & Domhoff, 2017), something that has been referred to as 
the ‘believing self’ (see Figure 4) in emotion research (Conner & Barrett, 2012). 
Asking people to provide general evaluations of their dream lives is particularly 
problematic when respondents’ dream recall rates are low, meaning that they do not 
have access to memories of dream experiences (Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2005; 
Schredl, 2002). Because such general evaluations tap into trait affect (Conner & 
Barrett, 2012), it is not surprising that other trait measures (e.g., personality traits) 
are often better correlated with dream questionnaires than with the content of dream 
diaries (e.g., Bernstein & Belicki, 1995-1996).  
3.2.2 Typical methods for measuring dream affect 
3.2.2.1  External ratings of dream affect 
In dream research, external ratings (ER)—or third-person ratings—have been the 
traditional method for measuring dream affect. With this method, narrative (written 
or oral) dream reports are collected and content analysed by ‘blind’ external judges, 
using a particular scale.  
Typically, ER are conducted using a detailed content analytic scale: a nominal 
scale with which the judges identify and classify every occurrence (or presence) of 
an affective state (emotions and moods are not distinguished) explicitly mentioned 
in the dream report into one of the discrete affect categories. Among the existing 
scales, one of the most widely used is the Hall and Van de Castle (1966) Emotions 
scale, which consists of five categories of discrete affect: anger, apprehension (e.g., 
fear, anxiety), sadness, happiness, and confusion. Using this scale, Hall and Van de 
Castle collected 1,000 dream reports from students (five each from 100 women and 
100 men) in the US between 1947 and 1950. Results based on these reports are often 
considered the ‘norms’ with which to compare findings from other studies. However, 
this scale is problematic because it has more negative affect (anger, apprehension, 
sadness) than positive affect (happiness) categories. Also, confusion has been 
classified as a negative affect category, which is questionable, since it contains 
affective states having both positive (e.g., amazed, awestruck) and undetermined 
(e.g., surprised) valence. As a result, with this scale ratings of dream affect may be 
biased towards a more negative valence.  
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In other studies, ER are conducted using global rating scales: ordinal (Likert) 
scales with which judges rate the whole dream report on some particular affective 
dimensions, such as the intensity of positive affect, the intensity of negative affect 
(Schredl & Doll, 1998), or overall affective intensity (e.g., De Gennaro et al., 2011). 
Whereas with detailed content analysis, only the presence of explicitly expressed 
affective states are coded, with global dimensional rating scales, the implicitly 
expressed affective states and their intensity are also rated. However, some 
researchers question the reliability and validity of intensity ratings performed by 
judges (Domhoff, 1996) and urge caution in inferring affective states from the 
reports (Windt, 2015). 
ER are often considered ‘objective’ because the use of narrative reports makes it 
possible for other researchers to reproduce the results (Domhoff, 1996; Schredl, 
2018). The use of at least two different judges enables the reduction of possible 
experimenter effects and the calculation of inter-rater reliability. However, even if 
high inter-rater reliability ratings are achieved, this does not necessarily mean that 
the ratings are also valid. For example, if no affective states are explicitly expressed 
in the dream report (e.g., “we played with the child”; “the beast was following me”), 
it is not possible to know whether this is because the dreamer did not experience any 
affective states in the dream or because the person simply failed to report these states.  
In narrative dream reports people describe their dream experiences as they 
remember them happening, using freely chosen words that they naturally use, and 
they are not confined to the items preselected by the researcher. However, such 
reports depend on the reporting and language skills of the participants (Kahan, 2012). 
It can be challenging to express complex experiences in words. Moreover, narrative 
reports follow a story-schema: participants are more likely to report some features 
of the content (e.g., what happened, where, who was present) than others (e.g., how 
they felt) (Kahan, 1994; Kahan & Horton, 2012; Kahan & LaBerge, 1996, 2011; 
Merritt, Stickgold, Pace-Schott, Williams, & Hobson, 1994). This means that 
narrative reports may specifically underrepresent affective dream experiences 
(Kahan & Claudatos, 2016; Kahn & Hobson, 2002; Strauch & Meier, 1996). Even if 
participants are explicitly instructed to describe their affective experiences, they may 
have difficulty labelling them.  
3.2.2.2  Self-ratings of dream affect 
Self-ratings (SR)—or first-person ratings—involve the collection of targeted (or 
affirmative) probes (Hobson & Stickgold, 1994; Nielsen, 2010). Targeted probes can 
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take the form of affect items, affect rating scales, or specific questions about dream 
affect, which the participants (i.e., the dreamers) are asked to rate or answer. 
Typically, participants are asked to provide global ratings of the preceding dream 
experience—the extent to which they experienced certain affective states in the 
dream as a whole (e.g., Blagrove, Farmer, & Williams, 2004; Schredl & Reinhard, 
2009-2010). Less frequently, they are asked to rate each line (e.g., Fosse et al., 2001; 
Merritt et al., 1994) or scene (Nielsen, Deslauriers, & Baylor, 1991) in the 
corresponding narrative dream report. 
A wide variety of rating scales are used for global SR. Discrete affect scales 
include lists of different affect items, and the participants are asked to rate the 
presence and intensity of each item in the preceding dream (e.g., Fosse et al., 2001; 
Kahn & Hobson, 2002; Kahn, Pace-Schott, & Hobson, 2002; Merritt et al., 1994; 
Nielsen et al., 1991). Dimensional scales range from those encompassing a single 
bipolar scale, with which participants must rate the overall affective tone or valence 
of the dream (e.g., Blagrove et al., 2004), to those including several unipolar scales 
that separately assess the intensity of positive affect and negative affect (e.g., 
(Schredl, 2018; Schredl & Reinhard, 2009-2010). 
The wide variety of scales used for SR makes it difficult to compare results from 
different studies. For example, some discrete affective states (e.g., awe) may appear 
relatively infrequently across different studies not because they are seldom 
experienced, but because they are seldom measured. Also, the choice of a particular 
scale is rarely justified. Surprisingly, empirically validated affect rating scales, such 
as those used in emotion research, have seldom been used (e.g., Stairs & Blick, 
1979). Instead, studies use different lists of ad hoc affect items, which poses a threat 
to validity. As with ER, the scales often consist of an unequal number of positive 
and negative affect items—with the number of negative affect items typically 
exceeding the number of positive affect items—which may inadvertently bias the 
results towards increased negativity by way of participants rating the items simply 
because they are presented.  
On the one hand, the use of targeted probes ensures that participants report 
experiences that may otherwise be left out of the narrative report, particularly affect 
experienced in the dream. On the other hand, the particular questions or affect items 
used may bias the results. For example, participants may choose an item they 
originally might have not chosen, they might want to choose an item that cannot be 
found on the list/scale, or the label used by the researcher and how the participant 
understands it may differ (Scherer, 2005). Furthermore, the ratings may be 
influenced by waking cognition at the time of rating—participants may incorrectly 
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assume that they felt a certain way based on the dream content (Domhoff, 2005; 
Foulkes, Sullivan, Kerr, & Brown, 1988; Kahn & Hobson, 2002; Zadra & Domhoff, 
2017). When Likert-type scales are used, systematic response biases, such as the 
tendency to only select extreme endpoints of the scale or to agree with all items, can 
influence the results (Baumgartner & Steenkamp, 2001; Paulhus, 1991; Paulhus & 
Vazire, 2007).
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4. Theoretical and empirical foundation 
Scientific research does not arise from a vacuum but builds on past work. Theories 
are based on existing empirical data and are either supported or challenged by new 
data. If new data support the predictions drawn from the theory, we can have 
confidence in the theory. If the data do not support the predictions, we may need to 
modify the theory. Thus, theories and data form a continuous research cycle through 
which theories are developed and adapted (Popper, 1959). 
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the theories and empirical research 
findings that the current thesis builds on. Although the studies conducted in the 
framework of this thesis did not directly test any particular dream theory, they do 
have implications for dream theories in general. Therefore, it is important to get an 
idea of what the different theories say about dream affect. Then, I review the 
empirical research literature that forms the foundation for the studies of the current 
thesis. Because this thesis focuses on affective dream experiences, the emphasis is 
on findings obtained with methods that come closest to investigating them—
narrative dream reports and ratings of affect collected upon awakening, either in the 
sleep laboratory or in the home environment.  
4.1 Theories of dreaming: How and why we 
experience affect in dreams 
A host of different theories of dreaming have been put forward. Most of these 
theories focus on dream experiences in general, not specifically on affective dream 
experiences. My purpose here is not to provide an exhaustive review of the various 
theories but to outline the central tenets of those theories that shed light on how or 
why we experience affect in dreams and that make either explicit or implicit 
predictions regarding the affective nature of dreams. 
In general, we can divide modern dream theories into two groups: theories that 
consider dream experiences to be a mere epiphenomenon (i.e., a by-product of 
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neurobiological processes occurring in the brain during sleep), and those that 
attribute a specific function to dream experiences. 
4.1.1 Non-functional dream theories 
According to the so-called non-functional theories, dreaming reflects important 
processes occurring in the brain during sleep but is not in itself functional. 
Random activation theories 13  (e.g., Flanagan, 1995; Hobson, 1988, 2009; 
Hobson & McCarley, 1977; Hobson et al., 2000) argue that dreaming results from 
the random activation of the forebrain—including memory and affect networks—by 
the brainstem mechanisms during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep. This activation 
leads to affective and perceptual dream experiences that are synthesized into a more 
or less coherent dream ‘story’ as the forebrain tries to make sense of these 
experiences. Affect is generated first and considered the primary driver of dream 
content. Because the activated affect-related networks and brain areas (e.g., 
amygdala) are thought to be preferentially involved in the processing of negative 
affect, dream experiences are assumed to be dominated by negative affect (e.g., fear 
or anxiety), although positive affect (e.g., joy or elation) is also considered relatively 
common (Flanagan, 2000; Hobson et al., 2000). Thus, dream experiences are 
considered inherently affective and often negatively valenced. Due to the activation 
of memory networks, dream experiences may reflect (i.e., be continuous with) our 
waking experiences, but they are nevertheless auto-created by the brain and, as a 
result, often unrelated (i.e., discontinuous with) to our waking life (see discussion on 
continuity and discontinuity in Hobson & Schredl, 2011 and Voss, Tuin, 
Schermelleh-Engel, & Hobson, 2011). 
Memory consolidation theories of dreaming (e.g., Payne, 2010; Stickgold, 
Hobson, Fosse, & Fosse 2001; Stickgold & Wamsley, 2017; Wamsley & Stickgold, 
2011) rely on a large body of evidence demonstrating that sleep plays a role in offline 
learning and the consolidation of memories (Alger et al., 2019; Payne & Kensinger, 
2018). These theories posit that dreaming reflects the memory consolidation 
process—the reactivation, reprocessing, and recombination of episodic memory 
elements from previous waking experiences with semantic information and affect. 
Because sleep, especially REM sleep, is involved in the consolidation of affective 
memories, the processing of affect is reflected in the affective content of dreams. 
Dreams contain both positive and negative affect and are not necessarily dominated 
by either. However, it is an open question whether dreams only reflect—or also 
 
13 The term random activation theory is adopted from Revonsuo (2000a) and Valli (2008). 
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actively contribute to—memory consolidation and learning (e.g., Wamsley & 
Stickgold, 2019).  
The cognitive (Foulkes, 1985, 1990) and neurocognitive (Domhoff, 2003, 2018) 
theories assert that dreaming is a form of ‘default’ activity that occurs spontaneously 
when the mind is not being constrained by external stimulation or task-related 
activity. As the names of the theories imply, dreaming is a form of internally 
generated cognition or thought and is considered akin to imagination (Foulkes & 
Domhoff, 2014), mind-wandering or daydreaming (Domhoff, 2018). Dreaming is 
supported by the activation of portions of the default mode network—a large-scale 
network of functionally connected brain areas, including areas related to the 
processing of affect (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal cortex) 
(Domhoff, 2018). Brain structures often associated with negative affectivity, such as 
the amygdala, can be—but do not have to be—activated (Domhoff, 2018). Dream 
content is thus formed by spontaneously activated semantic and episodic memory 
fragments, which are combined into a plausible simulation of the waking experience 
(Foulkes, 1990). However, dream experiences are mostly cognitive in nature, and 
affect can be present or absent from dream experiences.  
The continuity hypotheses14 (e.g., Bell & Hall, 1971; Domhoff, 1996, 2017; Hall 
& Nordby, 1972; Schredl, 2003; Schredl & Hofmann, 2003) assume that there is 
continuity between waking and dream experiences, that is, dream experiences reflect 
(the memory fragments of) waking experiences. Different formulations of the 
hypotheses conceptualize continuity differently. Dream experiences may be 
continuous with waking thoughts and affects, such as personal concerns and 
conceptions (Domhoff, 2017, 2018), or with waking behaviours, activities, and 
events (Schredl & Hofmann, 2003). Waking life experiences with higher affective 
intensity are assumed more likely to be incorporated into dream experiences 
(Schredl, 2003; Schredl, 2018). Also, these theories posit affective continuity 
between dream and waking experiences—pre- and post-sleep waking affect is 
considered to be associated with (or continuous with) dream affect (Schredl & 
Reinhard, 2009-2010).  
Based on a large body of neuropsychological data, Solms (1997, 2000, 2011) 
argues that dreaming is generated by the dopaminergic mesolimbic-mesocortical 
system, also known as the ‘reward’, ‘wanting’, or ‘SEEKING’15 system (Berridge, 
 
14 The term is used in plural because different versions of the continuity hypothesis exist 
(Tuominen, Stenberg, Revonsuo, & Valli, 2019).  
15 Panksepp (1998) uses uppercase letters to refer to a specific brain system underlying 
appetitive motivation, or curiosity/interest/foraging/anticipation/craving/expectancy. 
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1996; Panksepp, 1998; Rolls, 2000). Accordingly, dreaming reflects the SEEKING 
activity during sleep and is, therefore, particularly characterized by approach-related 
affect (e.g., curiosity and interest) and behaviours (e.g., exploration and novelty 
seeking) (Malcolm-Smith, Koopowitz, Pantelis, & Solms, 2012). The activation of 
medial and anterior temporal cortical areas further contributes to the affective quality 
of dreams (Solms, 2000).  
4.1.2 Functional dream theories 
Among the theories that attribute a specialized function to dream experiences, it is 
possible to distinguish between evolutionary and psychological theories of dream 
function. 
Evolutionary theories argue that dreaming is evolutionarily adaptive: during 
dreaming important skills are practised, because this was beneficial to the survival 
and reproduction of an organism in our evolutionary past (Revonsuo, 2000b; 
Revonsuo et al., 2016a). A prominent example is the threat simulation theory 
(Revonsuo, 2000b; Valli & Revonsuo, 2009), according to which the function of 
dreams is to selectively simulate threatening events (e.g., being chased or attacked) 
to rehearse threat-avoidance responses and behaviours. This would have been 
adaptive for ancestral humans, as it would have helped them to better deal with real 
threats during wakefulness. Threatening events during wakefulness trigger the 
activation of the threat simulation system, and during sleep memory traces with the 
highest negative affectivity are selected for simulation. At the neurobiological level, 
the threat simulation system is reflected in the activation of affect-related brain areas, 
such as the amygdala. According to this theory, dreams display a negativity bias: 
they include predominantly negative content (e.g., threats) and negative affect (e.g., 
fear). Bad dreams and nightmares are examples of a well-functioning threat 
simulation system.  
The social simulation theory (Revonsuo et al., 2016a) proposes that dreams 
selectively simulate social perception, social interaction, and social behaviours, and 
this rehearsal helps maintain and strengthen social bonds in wakefulness. As a result, 
dreams are biased towards social contents. Although the theory does not explicitly 
address dream affect, it assumes that dreams include more positive than negative 
social interactions, which implies that dreams may involve more positive than 
negative affect.  
Psychological theories of dream function argue that dreaming is psychologically 
adaptive: dreaming helps individuals cope better with waking life and hence 
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influences their mental health and well-being. Several different emotion processing 
and emotion regulation theories have been put forward (Cartwright, 1991, 2010; 
Hartmann, 1996, 2011; Kramer, 1991, 1993, 2007; Levin & Nielsen, 2007; 
Malinowski & Horton, 2015; Nielsen & Levin, 2007; Perogamvros & Schwartz, 
2012). As the name implies, these theories assign a central role to affect in the 
function of dreaming. According to these theories, dreams incorporate or reflect the 
dominant affect, affective concerns, or affective experiences of waking life. The 
function of dreams is to reprocess these memory elements, integrate them with 
existing memory traces so as to ultimately downregulate their intensity and thus help 
us cope better with these experiences during wakefulness. The activation of affect-
related brain areas (amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex) during sleep, particularly 
during REM sleep, is argued to provide a suitable condition for these processes and 
is taken to explain the highly affective nature of dream experiences.  
Most of the emotion regulation theories attribute a special role to negative affect: 
dreams specifically incorporate negative affective experiences (e.g., fear) and the 
processing of negative affect in dreams helps to downregulate it (Cartwright, 1991, 
2010; Hartmann, 1996, 2011; Levin & Nielsen, 2007; Nielsen & Levin, 2007). Other 
theories propose that affective intensity, rather than affective valence, determines 
what is incorporated into dreams and that dreams downregulate affective intensity in 
general (irrespective of positive or negative valence) (Kramer, 1991, 1993, 2007; 
Malinowski & Horton, 2015). Regardless, dreaming is seen as an “emotional 
thermostat” (Kramer, 1991, 1993) or “overnight therapy” (Hartmann, 1995; Walker 
& van der Helm, 2009) that helps affective adaptation in wakefulness. Bad dreams 
and nightmares are a failure of this process (Cartwright, 2010; Kramer, 1991, 1993, 
2019; Levin & Nielsen, 2009). The degree and effectiveness of emotion regulation 
during dreaming is influenced by both state and trait factors: waking affect load (i.e., 
elevated levels of life stress and negative events) and affect distress (i.e., disposition 
to experience stress and negative affect), respectively (Levin & Nielsen, 2009). 
The reward activation model (Perogamvros & Schwartz, 2012) combines the 
neuropsychological findings of Solms (1997, 2000) with the emotion regulation and 
memory consolidation theories. Dreaming and dream content are proposed to be 
generated by the activation of the reward-related mesolimbic dopaminergic, or the 
‘SEEKING’, system (Panksepp, 1998). The function of dreams is to expose the 
dreamer to affectively and motivationally relevant stimuli (i.e., appetitive and 
aversive) to aid in the offline consolidation of memories with high affective and 
motivational value, improve future performance during wakefulness, and aid in 
affect regulation. Dreams are thus characterized by both approach- and avoidance-
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related behaviours (e.g., exploration or novelty seeking vs avoiding a threat by 
fleeing) and affective states (e.g., interest vs fear) (Schwartz & Perogamvros, 2017). 
 
In summary, all of the theories reviewed above agree that dream experiences 
involve the activation of episodic memory elements that can be combined with 
affect. All of the theories also seem to assume that affective dream experiences occur 
due to the activation of the same brain areas that underlie affect in wakefulness. 
However, the theories disagree about the nature and function of dream affectivity. 
Whereas several theories argue that dreams are inherently affective, others consider 
dreams to be mostly cognitive in nature. Also, while many theories consider dreams 
to be negatively biased, others are more ambivalent regarding the prevailing valence 
of dreams. Finally, whereas some theories consider dream phenomenology, 
including affective experiences, to be unrelated to (or discontinuous with) waking 
phenomenology, according to others, dream affect is related to (or continuous 
with)—either simply reflecting or also contributing to—waking well-being. 
4.2 Empirical literature on methodological issues  
Theoretical disagreements about the phenomenology of dream affect (e.g., whether 
dreams are mostly affective or non-affective, negatively biased or not) are upheld by 
the empirical literature, which provides support for opposing views. The question 
arises as to what extent the study methodology—how dream affect has been 
measured (i.e., SR vs ER), and where and how the data have been collected (i.e., 
laboratory vs home environment)—can explain such controversies. Below, I review 
existing studies on these methodological issues. 
4.2.1 Self- versus external ratings of dream affect 
Studies using ER in the form of the detailed content analysis of dream reports have 
shown that most dream reports are non-affective (e.g., Domhoff, 2018; Hsu & Yu, 
2016; Snyder, 1970), with less than one affective state per report (e.g., Hall & Van 
de Castle, 1966; Hsu & Yu, 2016). Also, such studies have demonstrated that dream 
reports contain more negative than positive affect (e.g., Brown & Donderi, 1986; 
Domhoff, 2018; Hall & Van de Castle, 1966; Hsu & Yu, 2016; Snyder, 1970), with 
anxiety and/or fear being the most prevalent discrete affective states (Hall & Van de 
Castle, 1966; Hsu & Yu, 2016; McCarley & Hoffman, 1981; Snyder, 1970). 
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In contrast, studies using SR have found the majority of dreams to be affective 
(Fosse et al., 2001; Foulkes et al., 1988; St-Onge, Lortie-Lussier, Mercier, Grenier, 
& De Koninck, 2005; Strauch & Meier, 1996; Yu, 2007), with several affective states 
per dream (Blick & Howe, 1984; Howe & Blick, 1983; Kahn & Hobson, 2002; 
Merritt et al., 1994; Nielsen et al., 1991). Results regarding affective valence are 
mixed: from the dominance of negative affect (Blick & Howe, 1984; Kahan & 
Claudatos, 2016; Merritt et al., 1994; Nielsen et al., 1991), to a balanced amount of 
positive and negative affect (Fosse et al., 2001; Kahn & Hobson, 2002; Yu, 2007) or 
affective tone (Blagrove et al., 2004; Strauch & Meier, 1996), to the dominance of 
positive affect (St-Onge et al., 2005). These inconsistencies arguably depend on 
additional methodological differences between the studies, such as the data 
collection environment and procedure (St-Onge et al., 2005), the number and type 
of discrete affect items included (Kahan & Claudatos, 2016; St-Onge et al., 2005), 
and individual differences such as age (Blick & Howe, 1984; St-Onge et al., 2005) 
and mental health status (Cartwright, Young, Mercer, & Bears, 1998). Which 
discrete affect is the most prevalent depends on which particular items have been 
measured. Joy and interest are typically the most frequent among the positive 
affective states, while anxiety, fear, and anger are the most prevalent among the 
negative affective states.  
The findings reviewed above suggest that differences in the method of 
measurement—whether ER or SR has been used—may underlie (at least some) 
discrepancies in results. However, to determine whether this is indeed the case, 
systematic comparisons of SR and ER in the same sample are needed. In 1951, the 
eminent dream researcher Calvin S. Hall reported, albeit in a popular science journal, 
that dream reports content analysed by external judges contained more negative than 
positive affects, whereas the dreamers rated the same dreams to be more pleasant 
than unpleasant (Hall, 1951)16. More than two decades later, Stairs and Blick (1979) 
demonstrated that the participants’ own and judges’ ratings of dream affect had poor 
agreement. Another two decades later, Kahan and LaBerge (1996), who compared 
ER and SR of cognitive and metacognitive processes in dreams, reported a higher 
prevalence of dream affect with SR (93 %) than with ER (38 %).  
Besides these early reports, prior to the studies conducted in this thesis, only one 
study had directly compared SR and ER of dream affect in the same participants. In 
 
16 Specifically, Hall (1951) reported that, when written dream reports were content analysed, 
64 % of all dream affects (what he termed emotions) were negative and only 18 % positive. 
But participants themselves rated the same dreams more often pleasant (41 %) than 
unpleasant (25 %), with 11 % having mixed affective tone, and 23 % having no affect. 
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this previous study, Schredl and Doll (1998) measured dream affect in 133 home 
dream reports using three different rating methods: (1) SR using two dimensional, 
unipolar (four-point Likert) scales, one measuring the intensity of positive affect and 
the other the intensity of negative affect in the dream as a whole; (2) ER based on 
the detailed content analysis of dream reports (ER-CA) using the Emotions scale 
from the Hall and Van de Castle (1966) content analysis system; and (3) ER based 
on the global ratings of the dream report as a whole (ER-GS) using the same two 
dimensional rating scales as for SR. The results showed that whereas with SR almost 
all of the dreams (99.2 %), with ER-CA less than half of the dream reports (42.1 %), 
were rated to contain affect. With ER-GS, however, more than two-thirds of the 
dream reports (86.5 %) were rated to contain affect. Thus, when judges could infer 
affective states from dream action and rate affect in the dream report as a whole, 
differences in the degree of dream affectivity between SR and ER were smaller, as 
opposed to when judges were instructed to rate only explicitly expressed affect. 
Nevertheless, ER (irrespective of whether content analysis or global rating scales 
were used) yielded more than twice as many negative than positive dream reports. 
With SR, the percentage of negatively and positively valenced dreams was more 
balanced, although negatively rated dreams still prevailed. Moreover, with SR, as 
compared with ER-GS, the intensities of both positive and negative affect were 
higher, but the differences were larger for positive affect. Although women 
expressed more affect in dream reports (i.e., with ER), their SR of affect did not 
differ from those of men. Also, there were no gender differences in the valence of 
dream affect. 
Recently, Röver and Schredl (2017) replicated Schredl and Doll’s (1998) 
findings using SR and ER-GS. In addition, they found that longer dream reports and 
higher levels of extraversion were related to smaller differences between SR and ER-
GS with respect to negative affect ratings. According to the authors, this suggests 
that a more detailed description of the dream enables external judges to more 
accurately rate dream affect. Extraverts are more likely to express affect, and 
therefore external raters may find it easier to detect affect in their reports. However, 
in the study, this only explained ratings of negative affect, whereas differences with 
regard to positive affect remained unexplained. Gender did not explain differences 
in the results obtained with the two measures.  
In summary, ER and SR yield different results regarding the phenomenology of 
dream affect. This raises questions about the validity of the measures and calls for 
more systematic research on this methodological aspect. In particular, it is important 
to determine whether similar discrepancies are obtained when discrete affect is 
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measured with both ER and SR and when the number of positive and negative affect 
items is balanced, and whether these differences are specific to the data collection 
environment (i.e., home) or also emerge in other settings (i.e., in the sleep 
laboratory). To address these questions, Studies I and II were conducted. 
4.2.2 Home versus laboratory studies of dream affect 
Dream researchers have long debated whether and to what extent dream content 
differs depending on whether the data are collected in the home or in a sleep 
laboratory environment. Studies comparing home and laboratory dream reports from 
the same participants have demonstrated that home dream reports contain more 
aggression than laboratory dream reports (e.g., Domhoff & Kamiya, 1964; Domhoff 
& Schneider, 1999; Hall, 1966). However, aggressive content does not directly 
translate into affective content. 
Only a few studies have directly compared the affective content of dreams in the 
two settings. Table 2 gives an overview of the main features and results of existing 
studies. As shown, studies vary widely in the sample composition, dream sampling 
and reporting procedures, affect rating scales, and units of analysis used. Taken 
together, the findings of existing studies indicate that when the same dream sampling 
(morning awakenings) and reporting (oral or written) procedures are used in the 
home and laboratory setting, no differences exist in the ER of the affective content 
of dream reports (Foulkes, 1979, Study 3; Weisz & Foulkes, 1970). When different 
dream sampling (morning awakenings at home, but multiple REM awakenings in 
the laboratory) and reporting (written reports at home, but oral reports in the 
laboratory) procedures are used, home dreams are rated (with both ER and SR) to 
contain more affect, especially negative affect (Foulkes, 1979, Study 4; Okuma et 
al., 1975; St-Onge et al., 2005). This pattern of findings suggests that differences in 
the two settings are less due to where (home vs lab) than how the data have been 
collected.  
At least three methodological aspects may help explain the differences observed 
in these studies. First, the reporting modality: at home dream reports are written 
down, whereas they are reported orally in the laboratory. Reporting modality has 
been shown to lead to different results regarding at least some aspects of dream 
content (Casagrande & Cortini, 2008), although due to the lack of research, it is not 
known whether and how this influences the affective content of dreams. However, 
Foulkes (1979, Study 4) and Okuma et al. (1975), who used the same reporting 
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procedure at home and in the lab, still found more affective content in home dream 
reports. This suggests that reporting modality alone cannot explain the differences.  
Second, dream reports in the two settings derive from different sleep stages. 
Laboratory dream reports have been collected upon awakening from REM, whereas 
home dream reports possibly derive from different—REM and NREM—sleep 
stages. Although differences in the affective content of REM and NREM dream 
reports are recognized (Foulkes, 1962; Smith et al., 2004; Wamsley, Hirota, Tucker, 
Smith, & Antrobus, 2007), these differences seem to disappear when the reports are 
obtained upon morning awakening (Cicogna, Natale, Occhionero, & Bosinelli, 1998; 
McNamara, McLaren, & Durso, 2007). This indicates that differences between home 
and laboratory REM dream reports arising due to differences in sleep stages should 
be minimal, because home dream reports derive from morning awakenings. 
This brings us to the third explanation. Dream reports collected at home and in 
the laboratory derive from different times of night. Reports collected at home upon 
morning awakenings mostly represent late-night/early-morning dreams (Hall, 1966), 
whereas reports collected in the laboratory upon REM awakenings represent dreams 
from different times of night—from both early-night and late-night/early-morning 
periods. Late-REM dreams have been shown to be longer and contain more affect 
than early-REM dreams (Agargun & Cartwright, 2003; Verdone, 1965; cf. Fosse et 
al., 2001). Thus, home dream reports collected in the typical manner (i.e., upon 
morning awakening) may contain more affect, because they represent a selective 
sample of late-night (REM or NREM) dreams, whereas sleep laboratory dream 
reports collected in the typical manner (i.e., upon multiple REM awakenings) 
represent both early- and late-night REM dreams. Because a direct comparison of 
home dream reports with early- and late-REM laboratory dream reports can help to 
shed light on this issue, Study III was conducted. 
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54 Table 2. Overview of studies comparing the affective content of home and laboratory dreams 
Findings regarding 
the differences 
between home (H) 
and laboratory (L) 
dreams 
 
NS 
Dreams containing 
"emotional elements": 
1. H > L  
 
 
 
2. H > L 
1. NS 
 
2. Fear: H > L 
Pleasant hedonic 
tone: H > L 
 
Unit of 
analysis: 
whole dream 
(D) or every 
occurrence 
of affect (E) 
within dream 
 
D 
E 
1. E + D 
 
2. D 
Self-
ratings 
(SR) or 
external 
ratings 
(ER) 
 
ER 
ER 
 
1. ER 
 
2. SR 
Affect rating scale 
 
2 dimensions from 
Hauri, Sawyer, & 
Rechtschaffen (1967): 
"Vivid Fantasy"a and 
"Hedonic Tone" 
Hall & Van de Castle 
(1966) content 
analysis system: all 
five categories (anger; 
apprehension; 
happiness; sadness;  
confusion)  
evaluated as one 
"emotional elements" 
category 
8 categories from the 
Scoring System for 
Children's dreams 
(Foulkes & Shepherd, 
1970): afraid; angry; 
sad; happy; surprised; 
excited; confused; 
any. Overall hedonic 
tone 
Reporting procedure 
Laboratory 
Oral 
Oral 
Written 
Home 
Oral 
1. Written 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Oral 
Written 
Sampling procedure 
 
 
Laboratory 
Morning 
awakenings 
(2 non-
consecutive 
nights) 
Multiple REM 
awakenings 
(during 1967-
1968) 
Morning 
awakenings  
(3 consecutive 
nights) 
Home 
Morning 
awakenings  
(2 non-
consecutive 
nights) 
1. Morning 
awakenings  
(2 weeks; 
during 1967-
1968) 
 
2. REM 
awakenings 
using the 
"Dream 
Detector" 
(during 1972-
1973) 
Morning 
awakenings  
(3 consecutive 
nights) 
Sample 
 
12 young  
males 
(19-28y) 
5 male 
psychiatrists  
(25-47y) 
14 children  
(8 girls,  
6 boys;  
10-11y) 
Study 
 
Weisz and 
Foulkes 
(1970) 
Okuma et 
al. (1975) 
Foulkes, 
(1979, 
Study 3) 
 
Theoretical and em
pirical foundation 
55 
Table 2 continues… 
1. Affect: H > L 
Afraid: H > L 
Angry: H > L 
Excited: H > L 
Unpleasant hedonic 
tone: H > L 
Length: H < L 
 
 
2. Affect: H > L 
 
Presence and 
intensity of affect:  
H > L 
 
Presence and 
intensity of negative 
affect: H > L  
 
Most frequent affect 
items: 
H: anxiety (57.5%), 
uncertainty (56.7%), 
quietness (52.6%), 
contentment (51%). 
L: quietness (57%), 
happiness (46.3%), 
cheerfulness (46.3%) 
Note. aIncludes also other variables not measuring affective states. NS = no significant differences. Adapted from Sikka, Revonsuo, Sandman, Tuominen, 
and Valli, 2018, pp. 2-3. 
 
E + D 
 
D 
ER 
SR  
(upon 
morning 
awake-
ning) 
 
Scoring System for 
Children's dreams 
(Foulkes & 
Shepherd,1970) 
8 items;  
4 positive:  
happiness, 
contentment, 
quietness, 
cheerfulness;  
4 negative:  
anger, sadness, 
uncertainty, anxiety 
 
1. Oral 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Written 
(morning 
reports of 
recalled 
dreams) 
Oral 
Written 
Written 
Multiple REM 
awakenings  
(2 non-
consecutive 
nights) 
Multiple REM 
awakenings  
(1 night) 
Morning 
awakenings  
(6 consecutive 
mornings) 
Morning 
awakenings  
(7 consecutive 
days) 
18 children  
(7 girls,  
11 boys; 
12-13 y) 
28 younger 
(20-33 y) vs  
30 older  
(60-77 y) 
women 
Foulkes, 
(1979, 
Study 4) 
St-Onge 
et al. 
(2005) 
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4.3 Empirical literature on the correlates of dream 
affect 
Wakefulness and sleep are two distinct behavioural and neurophysiological states. 
This raises the question as to whether and to what extent the experiences we have in 
these states are similar or different, related or unrelated to each other. Specifically, 
is dream affect continuous or discontinuous with our waking experiences? And do 
affective experiences in these two states rely on shared neural substrates, as predicted 
by dream theories? Research on the waking well-being and neural correlates of 
dream affect can help answer these questions. 
4.3.1 Dream affect and waking well-being 
Clinical practitioners have long assumed that the content of dreams provides a 
window into the mental health of individuals (Pesant & Zadra, 2004). This idea dates 
back to the work of Freud (1900/1955) and Jung (1945/1974), who emphasized the 
importance of understanding dreams and considered dream work to have therapeutic 
value. Empirical research in clinical populations has indeed shown that people with 
various mental health and sleep disorders report frequent nightmares (i.e., dreams 
with extremely negative content that may awaken the dreamer) and negatively toned 
dreams (for reviews, see Levin & Nielsen, 2007, 2009; Nielsen & Carr, 2017; 
Nielsen & Levin, 2007; Skancke, Holsen, & Schredl, 2014). However, many studies 
have used dream questionnaires—rather than sleep laboratory awakenings or home 
dream diaries—which, as discussed previously, are methodologically problematic 
for drawing inferences about affective dream experiences. 
Studies based on nonclinical samples and home dream diaries are limited and 
findings mixed. People who experience more anxious and depressive affective states 
in wakefulness are more likely to rate their dreams as negative (Blagrove et al., 2004) 
and to express negative affect in dream reports (King & DeCicco, 2007). Also, 
individuals with more symptoms of general psychopathology and higher trait anxiety 
express more negative affect in dream reports (Pesant & Zadra, 2006). Yet, other 
studies do not provide support for the relationship between general psychopathology, 
trait anxiety, depression, and dream affect (Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2005; 
Demacheva & Zadra, 2019; Schredl & Engelhardt, 2001; Zadra & Donderi, 2000).  
In addition to inconsistent findings, research on the relationship between dream 
affect and waking well-being suffers from a conceptual problem: most studies have 
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actually investigated only waking ill-being (i.e., symptoms of, or traits related to, 
psychopathology). Because well-being (and mental health in general) is not simply 
the absence of ill-being (Keyes, 2005; Seligman, 1999; World Health Organization, 
2018), we must also investigate how waking well-being as such is associated with 
dream affect. 
But what is well-being? Well-being is a heterogeneous concept. Here, I limit the 
discussion to mental (as opposed to physical) well-being. In well-being research, it 
is generally agreed that at least two different types of well-being exist—hedonic and 
eudaimonic (Ryan & Deci, 2001; cf. Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, & King, 2008; Ward 
& King, 2016). Hedonic well-being (HWB) refers to how people feel and think about 
their lives—how happy they consider themselves to be. It is operationalized as 
subjective well-being (Diener, 1984, 2013), consisting of two affective (positive and 
negative affect) and two cognitive or evaluative (life satisfaction and domain 
satisfaction) components (Diener, Scollon, & Lucas, 2009; Pavot & Diener, 2013). 
Eudaimonic well-being (EWB) refers to how virtuously people live their lives—
whether they are flourishing (Huta & Waterman, 2014). Despite slightly different 
conceptualizations and operationalizations, most EWB measures emphasize the 
sense of meaning and purpose in life (Huta & Waterman, 2014; Vittersø, 2016). 
Although they are conceptually distinct, HWB and EWB are empirically related 
(Waterman, 2008). In addition to HWB and EWB, arguably a distinct aspect of well-
being—a state of inner peace and harmony—exists that is largely neglected in the 
current framework of well-being. Lee and colleagues (Lee, Lin, Huang, & 
Fredrickson, 2013) developed the peace of mind construct and the Peace of Mind 
Scale to measure this type of well-being in the Chinese cultural context. Although 
peace of mind is especially valued in Eastern cultures, people in Western countries 
also associate well-being (or happiness) with inner peace and harmony (Delle Fave, 
Brdar, Freire, Vella-Brodrick, & Wissing, 2011; Delle Fave et al., 2016; Synard & 
Gazzola, 2017). However, in Western cultures this aspect of well-being has not yet 
been explored. In summary, there are several different types (and components) of 
well-being that are distinct from ill-being. 
Because dream research and well-being research have developed relatively 
independently, the different aspects of well-being have been rarely addressed in 
dream studies. The handful of studies that do exist have measured HWB, or some of 
its components, and produced discrepant findings. For example, whereas Gilchrist, 
Davidson, and Shakespeare-Finch (2007) found a weak negative correlation between 
life satisfaction and negative dream affect, St-Onge et al. (2005) failed to observe 
any significant relationships between life satisfaction and (positive or negative) 
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dream affect. Whereas state affect in wakefulness has been found to be positively 
correlated with respective dream affect (Gilchrist et al., 2007; Schredl & Reinhard, 
2009-2010; Yu, 2007), trait affect in wakefulness has not been associated with dream 
affect (Gilchrist et al., 2007).  
Thus, there is scarcity of research not only on the relationship between dream 
affect and waking ill-being but even more so on the relationship between dream 
affect and waking well-being. The mixed findings likely arise from methodological 
differences between the studies. Specifically, whereas some studies have used SR of 
dream affect, others have used ER of dream affect. If SR and ER yield different 
results regarding dream affect, the two measures may be differently associated with 
ill-being and well-being. Also, results may differ depending on whether waking 
states (e.g., state anxiety, state affect) or waking traits (e.g., trait anxiety, trait affect) 
have been measured. All of this underscores the need for more research informed by 
the science of well-being and by the methodological considerations discussed in 
previous chapters. To address this need, Study IV was carried out. 
4.3.2 Neural correlates of dream affect 
Since the discovery of REM sleep and its association with dreaming in the 1950s 
(Aserinsky & Kleitman, 1953, 1955; Dement & Kleitman, 1957), researchers have 
studied the neurobiology of REM sleep in the hope of shedding light on the neural 
processes underlying dream experiences. However, this approach was increasingly 
questioned with the accumulation of findings showing that dream experiences can 
also occur outside of REM sleep (e.g., Foulkes, 1962) and that abolishing REM does 
not abolish dreaming (Solms, 2000). It is now well recognized that REM sleep and 
dreaming are doubly dissociable states (Nir & Tononi, 2010; Solms, 2000), which 
means that brain activity during REM sleep does not necessarily translate into the 
neural correlates of dream experiences. 
Recently, considerable progress has been made in elucidating the neural 
correlates of dreaming in general (Siclari et al., 2017; Siclari, Bernardi, Cataldi, & 
Tononi, 2018; for a review, see Cipolli, Ferrara, De Gennaro, & Plazzi, 2017) and of 
the specific contents of dream experiences in particular. Specifically, it has been 
shown that different contents of dream experiences—visual perception, thoughts, 
movement, and speech—involve the same brain areas as in wakefulness (Dresler et 
al., 2011; Hong et al., 1996; Horikawa et al., 2013; Perogamvros et al., 2017; Siclari 
et al., 2017). Because studies on non-affective experiences suggest continuity in the 
underlying neural mechanisms across wakefulness and sleep (see also De Gennaro, 
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Marzano, Cipolli, & Ferrara, 2012; Domhoff & Fox, 2015; Fox, Nijeboer, 
Solomonova, Domhoff, & Christoff, 2013; Wamsley, 2013), it is reasonable to 
assume that affective experiences also share neural processes across the two 
behavioural states.  
Indeed, neuroimaging studies have consistently demonstrated increased 
activation of affect-related brain areas (e.g., amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex) 
during REM sleep, as compared with wakefulness and NREM sleep (Braun et al., 
1998; Maquet et al., 1996; Nofzinger, Mintun, Wiseman, Kupfer, & Moore, 1997). 
This is often assumed to reflect the intensely affective nature of REM dreams. 
However, to understand the neural correlates of affective experiences—while 
dreaming or awake—we cannot measure brain activity alone, but we must obtain 
self-reports of experiences and map them onto concurrent neural activity. The latter 
is especially challenging when investigating dream affect due to the retrospective 
nature of the self-reports of dream experiences. Nevertheless, “if we don't keep our 
attention on the psychology of the dream, we might find out a lot of biology without 
knowing what it is the biology of” (Rechtschaffen, as cited in Kramer, 1970, p. 149). 
Studies relating the affective content of dream reports to structural differences in 
affect-related brain areas (e.g., amygdala) have yielded ambiguous results (Blake, 
Terburg, Balchin, van Honk, & Solms, 2019; De Gennaro et al., 2011). Importantly, 
only a few studies have investigated how self-reports of dream affect, obtained 
immediately upon awakening, are associated with neural activity occurring during 
pre-awakening sleep (Daoust, Lusignan, Braun, Mottron, & Godbout, 2008; Nielsen 
& Chénier, 1999; Sterpenich, Perogamvros, Tononi, & Schwartz, 2019). 
Consequently, we know very little about the neural correlates of dream affect. 
The search for the neural correlates of affective dream experiences is best 
informed by knowledge about the neural correlates of affective experiences in 
wakefulness. Research on the neural basis of affect in wakefulness has flourished 
since the emergence of the field of affective neuroscience in the 1990s (Davidson & 
Sutton, 1995; Panksepp, 1991, 1998). However, stemming from conceptual 
disagreements, the field is fraught with heated debates regarding the appropriate 
level of analysis of affect (i.e., whether affect is represented in the brain in the form 
of discrete affective states or affective dimensions). What does emerge from existing 
studies, however, is that no specific brain structures are specialized for affect in 
general or for some discrete affective states in particular. Rather, there seems to be 
a distributed network of functionally integrated subcortical and cortical brain areas, 
which are assumed to underlie either discrete affect (Kragel & LaBar, 2016; 
Nummenmaa & Saarimäki, 2017; Pessoa, 2017; Saarimäki et al., 2016), affective 
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dimensions (Lindquist et al., 2012), or other basic affect-related processes (Wager et 
al., 2015). 
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is an important hub (i.e., highly interconnected 
region) in this network. Several lesion, neuroimaging, neurophysiological, and brain 
stimulation studies have provided evidence for the lateralization of affective 
processing within the PFC (for reviews, see Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2018; Kelley, 
Hortensius, Schutter, & Harmon-Jones, 2017; Miller, Crocker, Spielberg, 
Infantolino, & Heller, 2013). In particular, four decades of research have shown that 
EEG frontal alpha asymmetry (FAA)—a relative difference in alpha power between 
the right and left frontal cortical regions—is associated with state and trait affect, as 
well as with the regulation of affect in wakefulness (see Reznik & Allen, 2018 for a 
review). FAA is typically calculated by subtracting (the natural log of) alpha power 
(8–13 Hz) in the left hemisphere from the homologous region in the right hemisphere 
(i.e., ln[F4]–ln[F3]). Because alpha power is inversely related to cortical activity 
(Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; Klimesch, 2012; Klimesch, Sauseng, & Hanslmayr, 
2007), higher FAA scores are assumed to reflect relatively greater left frontal activity 
(i.e., more right-frontal alpha power). 
Numerous studies conducted in wakefulness have shown that resting FAA is 
related to certain affective dimensions. According to the affective valence model of 
FAA, positive affect is related to relatively greater left-sided—and negative affect to 
greater right-sided—activity (Davidson, Schwartz, Saron, Bennett, & Goleman, 
1979; Tomarken, Davidson, Wheeler, & Doss, 1992). However, in earlier studies, 
valence was often confounded with motivational direction (i.e., positive affect is 
typically associated with approach tendencies, whereas negative affect is typically 
associated with withdrawal tendencies). Subsequent research provided evidence for 
the approach–withdrawal model of FAA: motivational approach-related affect, 
independent of valence (e.g., interest, anger), is related to relatively greater left-
sided—but withdrawal-related affect (e.g., fear, anxiety) to relatively greater right-
sided—activity (see Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2018 for review). However, whereas 
the relationship between FAA and approach-related affect has gained considerable 
support, the relationship between FAA and withdrawal-related affect is less 
consistent (Coan & Allen, 2004). As a result, it was recently proposed that FAA 
reflects supervisory or regulatory control: enhanced regulation of affect and 
behaviour is associated with greater right-sided frontal activity (Gable, Mechin, 
Hicks, & Adams, 2015; Gable, Neal, & Threadgill, 2018). 
Not only is FAA responsive to situation-specific fluctuations in affect, but it has 
also been shown to be stable over time (Allen, Coan, & Nazarian, 2004; Hagemann, 
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Naumann, Thayer, & Bartussek, 2002; Tomarken et al., 1992). Studies have 
demonstrated that FAA is stable across wakefulness and sleep, with the strongest 
correlations occurring between pre-sleep wakefulness and REM sleep (Benca et al., 
1999; Schmidt, Cote, Santesso, & Milner, 2003). Thus, FAA has trait-like features. 
In fact, about 60 % of the variance in resting FAA is attributed to trait-like factors, 
whereas about 40 % to state-specific effects (Hagemann et al., 2002). As a result, it 
has been suggested that FAA may reflect trait affect, or a person’s affective style—
the propensity to react a certain way to affective stimuli (Davidson, 1998). Indeed, 
several studies in wakefulness have found that FAA predicts subsequent affective 
responses (Coan & Allen, 2004) and correlates with trait affect measures, such as 
trait anger (e.g., Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998).  
Despite considerable research on the relationship between FAA and affect in 
wakefulness, prior to the study carried out in this thesis, only one published study 
had investigated the relationship between FAA during REM sleep and corresponding 
dream affect17. Daoust et al. (2008) analysed the affective content of laboratory 
dream reports collected upon REM awakenings from 12 individuals diagnosed with 
autistic spectrum disorder and 11 healthy controls. No significant correlations were 
found between FAA and dream affect. However, in the analysis, the authors pooled 
together all of the affective states (regardless of valence, motivational direction or 
discrete affect) and participants (autistic spectrum and control) and collected a small 
number of dream reports (N = 23) that contained less than one affective state per 
report. All of this may have resulted in null findings. Also, because the authors used 
only ER of dream affect, it is unclear whether the results may have been influenced 
by the method of measurement.  
If the neural processes underlying affective experiences are shared across 
wakefulness and sleep, as predicted by dream theories and supported by existing 
empirical findings, FAA during sleep should also be related to affective experiences 
in dreams. Moreover, if FAA has trait-like properties, it should not only be stable 
across wakefulness and sleep but also predict affective dream experiences from 
waking pre-sleep FAA. Study V was conducted to test these predictions. 
 
17 Several papers also refer to a conference abstract (Donzella, Davidson, Stickgold, & 
Hobson, 1994) that purportedly reports to have found an association between waking FAA 
and dream affect during subsequent sleep. However, this abstract is not available (personal 
communication with the first author), and the study was never published.  
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5. Aims of empirical studies  
As described in the previous chapter, existing theories and empirical research 
findings paint a confusing, and rather incompatible, picture of the affective nature of 
dreams. This arguably results from methodological differences between studies, 
specifically, whether SR or ER of dream affect have been used and whether data 
have been collected at home or in the sleep laboratory. Resulting from these and 
other methodological and conceptual issues, findings regarding the correlates of 
dream affect are inconsistent and inconclusive.  
To be able to draw any firm conclusions about the affective nature of dreams and 
its correlates, we must ensure that we have valid and reliable measures for studying 
dream affect. It is important to conduct systematic studies that directly compare 
different data collection and analysis methods to gain a better understanding of how 
the various methodological issues influence findings regarding dream affect. 
Therefore, the overall aim of the empirical studies conducted in the framework of 
this thesis was to investigate the phenomenology and correlates of dream affect, as 
well as how results regarding these are influenced by study methodology. Studies I–
III focused specifically on methodological issues: the comparison of SR and ER of 
dream affect (Studies I–II) and the comparison of affect in home versus laboratory 
dream reports (Study III). Studies IV and V investigated the correlates of dream 
affect: waking well-being (Study IV) and neural (Study V) correlates. The specific 
aims of the individual studies were as follows: 
Study I: to compare SR and ER of dream affect in the same set of dreams 
collected in the sleep laboratory.  
Study II: to compare SR and ER of dream affect in the same set of dreams 
collected in the home environment.  
Study III: to compare the affective content of dream reports collected at home 
upon morning awakenings with those collected in the sleep laboratory upon early- 
and late-REM sleep awakenings. 
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Study IV: to investigate the relationship between dream affect and waking well-
being in a comprehensive framework, including measures of both waking ill-being 
and waking well-being.  
Study V: to investigate the EEG correlates of affect in REM sleep dreams, 
specifically the relationship between FAA (during REM sleep and evening 
wakefulness) and dream affect (specifically, dream anger and dream interest). 
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6. Methods 
6.1 Participants 
Data were collected as part of two larger independent data collection efforts. Data 
collection I—Studies I, III, and V—was conducted at the University of Turku, 
Finland. After several screening rounds, of the 159 volunteers, 21 were invited to, 
and 19 participated in, the sleep laboratory experiment. Due to technical problems 
or missing data, data from 17 (Studies I and V) or 18 (Study III) healthy, right-
handed, native Finnish speaking participants with good sleep quality (score ≤ 5 on 
the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index; Buysse, Reynolds, Monk, Berman, & Kupfer, 
1989) were included in the analyses. Data collection II—Studies II and IV—was 
conducted at the University of Skövde, Sweden. Forty-seven healthy, native Swedish 
speakers were recruited and provided data. However, the final sample included 44 
participants, since three participants (one man, two women) did not provide enough 
data (i.e., at least five dream reports) and were excluded. See Table 3 for details of 
the final samples. 
6.2 Procedure 
Data collection I (Studies I, III, and V) took place both in the participants’ home 
environment and in the sleep laboratory. Before the sleep laboratory sessions, 
participants were asked to fill in home dream diaries (see Section 6.3.1) during a 7-
day period, in which they provided written narrative dream reports. The laboratory 
procedure is described in Figure 6. Participants spent two non-consecutive nights in 
the sleep laboratory at the Department of Psychology, University of Turku. To 
ensure that the participants would not be sleep deprived, the two laboratory nights 
were separated by a week. Participants arrived at the laboratory in the evening, two 
hours before their typical bedtimes. After the EEG, EOG, and EMG electrodes had 
been attached, participants were asked to lie in bed while their waking resting state 
(evening baseline) EEG was recorded during eight one-minute sessions (four with 
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eyes closed and four with eyes open, order counterbalanced). These recordings were 
performed between 10:30 and 12:00 p.m. Participants then rated their current waking 
affect using the Finnish version of the modified Differential Emotions Scale (mDES; 
see Section 6.3.2).  
Subsequently, participants were allowed to fall asleep. Their sleep stages were 
scored visually (Iber, Ancoli-Israel, Chesson, & Quan, 2007; Rechtschaffen & Kales, 
1968) by researchers who were monitoring the participants (via a camera and 
intercom system) throughout the night in a room adjacent to the laboratory bedroom. 
Multiple REM awakenings were performed: each and every time a REM sleep 
episode had continuously lasted for five minutes and was in a phasic stage, 
participants were awakened using a tone signal. Awakenings were performed in the 
phasic stage to ensure consistency and because tonic and phasic REM are known to 
differ in the underlying neurophysiology (e.g., Simor, Gombos, Szakadát, Sándor, & 
Bódizs, 2016; Wehrle et al., 2007) and dream content (Molinari & Foulkes, 1969). 
Participants were instructed to first report the last image they had had in mind right 
before awakening and then the whole dream, in as much detail as possible. These 
oral narrative reports were recorded using a microphone hanging above the bed. 
Then, participants rated their affective experiences in the preceding dream by filling 
in the mDES (as targeted probes) using a mouse and a computer screen placed above 
the bed. When participants did not recall a dream, researchers asked them to specify 
whether they had not had a dream or whether they felt like they had had a dream but 
were unable to recall any content (a so-called ‘white dream’; Strauch & Meier, 
1996). In such cases, however, mDES was not filled in. Participants then continued 
their sleep. The procedure was repeated throughout the night until the final morning 
awakening, between 5:30 and 8:30 a.m. After having reported and rated their last 
dream, participants were asked to lie awake in bed. As in the evening, participants’ 
waking resting state (morning baseline) EEG was recorded (8 min) and their current 
waking affect measured (using mDES).  
Following Casagrande, Violani, Lucidi, Buttinelli, and Bertini (1996), the first 
two REM episodes were defined as early REM, and all of the other REM episodes 
as late REM. 
Data collection II (Studies II and IV) took place in the participants’ home 
environment. First, participants were asked to fill in an online well-being 
questionnaire (see Section 6.3.3.). Then, they logged onto and filled in a written 
online home dream diary (see Section 6.3.1.) every morning upon awakening, during 
a 21-day period. In this diary, participants provided written narrative dream reports 
and rated the affect they experienced in their dreams using the mDES. 
Pilleriin Sikka 
66 
Table 3. Overview of the samples and methodology of empirical studies 
 Study I Study II Study III Study IV Study V 
RATIO-
NALE 
 Comparison 
of SR and 
ER of dream 
affect in 
laboratory 
dreams 
Comparison 
of SR and 
ER of dream 
affect in 
home 
dreams 
Comparison 
of home and 
laboratory 
dream 
reports with 
respect to 
dream affect 
Waking well-
being 
correlates of 
SR and ER 
of dream 
affect 
EEG 
correlates of 
SR (and ER) 
of dream 
affect  
WHO Gender 7M, 10F 16M, 28F 7M, 11F 16M, 28F 7M, 10F 
Age 
(M±SD) 
25.76±4.93 26.9±5.1 25.89±4.85 26.9±5.1 25.76±4.93 
Culture Western  Western  Western  Western  Western  
Society WEIRD WEIRD WEIRD WEIRD WEIRD 
Country Finland Sweden Finland Sweden Finland 
Health 
status 
Healthy Healthy Healthy Healthy Healthy 
Other PSQI ≤ 5  PSQI ≤ 5  PSQI ≤ 5 
WHERE Environ-
ment 
Lab Home Home vs lab Home Lab 
WHAT Type of 
self-report 
Narrative 
reports + 
targeted 
probes 
Narrative 
reports + 
targeted 
probes 
Narrative 
reports 
Narrative 
reports + 
targeted 
probes 
Targeted 
probes (+ 
narrative 
reports) 
Reporting 
modality 
(narrative 
reports) 
Oral Written Written 
(home) vs 
oral (lab) 
Written Oral 
Ratings ER vs SR ER vs SR ER ER vs SR SR (+ ER) 
Affect 
rating scale 
mDES mDES mDES mDES mDES 
Unit of 
analysis 
Every 
occurrence 
of affect 
(ER) vs 
whole 
dream (SR) 
Every 
occurrence 
of affect 
(ER) vs 
whole 
dream (SR) 
Every 
occurrence 
of affect 
Every 
occurrence 
of affect 
(ER) vs 
whole 
dream (SR) 
Every 
occurrence 
of affect 
(ER) vs 
whole 
dream (SR) 
WHEN 
 
 
 
Temporal 
lag 
Very short Short Short 
(home) vs 
very short 
(lab)  
Short Very short 
 Time of 
night 
Early/ 
middle/ 
late 
Not 
controlled, 
but most 
likely late 
Not 
controlled 
(home) vs 
early/ 
middle/ 
late (lab) 
Not 
controlled, 
but most 
likely late 
Early/ 
middle/ 
late 
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 Sleep 
stage 
REM Unspecified Unspecified 
(home) vs 
REM (lab) 
Unspecified REM 
 Time in 
sleep stage 
5 min Unspecified Unspecified 
(home) vs 
5 min (lab)  
Unspecified 5 min 
HOW Method of 
awakening 
Experi-
menter-
induced 
Self-
induced/ 
sponta-
neous 
Self-
induced/ 
sponta-
neous 
(home) vs 
experi-
menter-
induced 
(lab) 
Self-
induced/ 
sponta-
neous 
Experi-
menter-
induced 
Experi-
mental 
situation 
Participant 
closely 
monitored 
Participant 
monitored 
from a 
distancea 
Participant 
not 
monitored 
(home) vs 
participant 
closely 
monitored 
(lab) 
Participant 
monitored 
from a 
distancea 
Participant 
closely 
monitored 
Number of 
nights: data 
collection 
period 
2 21 7 (home)  
vs  
2 (lab)  
21 2 
Total (and 
mean) 
number of 
dream 
reports 
115 (6.76) 552 (12.55) 133 (7.39; 
lab) vs 
151 (8.39; 
home)  
552 (12.55) 115 (6.76) 
Model of 
affect: 
measured 
Discrete Discrete Discrete Discrete Discrete 
Model of 
affect: 
analysed 
Dimensional 
(PA, NA) + 
discrete 
Dimensional 
(PA, NA) + 
discrete 
Dimensional 
(PA, NA) + 
discrete 
Dimensional 
(PA, NA) 
 
Discrete  
Aspect of 
Affect: 
measured 
ER: 
presence 
SR: 
presence + 
intensity 
ER: 
presence 
SR: 
presence + 
intensity 
presence 
 
ER: 
presence 
SR: 
presence + 
intensity 
ER: 
presence 
SR: 
presence + 
intensity 
Aspect of 
Affect: 
analysed 
Presence 
 
Presence 
 
Presence 
 
ER: 
presence 
SR: intensity 
Intensity  
(for ER 
presence) 
Note. SR = self-ratings; ER = external ratings; M = males; F = females; WEIRD = western, 
educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic; mDES = modified Differential Emotions 
Scale; REM = rapid eye movement sleep; PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect. 
aResearchers can see whether (and when) participants have logged on to the online dream 
report. 
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All studies were carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and were 
approved by the Ethical Board of the University of Turku, Finland (Studies I, III, V) 
or the Regional Ethical Review Board in Gothenburg, Sweden (Studies II, IV). Prior 
to data collection, participants signed an informed consent form. In Studies I, III, and 
V participants received monetary compensation of €100; in Studies II and IV 
participants did not receive any payment.  
Figure 6. Description of the experimental procedure in the sleep laboratory. Reprinted from 
Sikka, Revonsuo, Noreika, and Valli, 2019, p. 4777. 
6.3 Measurements 
6.3.1 Home dream diary  
Instructions for dream diaries were based on previous studies (e.g., Revonsuo & 
Salmivalli, 1995). Participants were asked to fill in the dream diary every morning 
immediately upon awakening. They were first asked whether they remembered 
having any dreams that night or whether they thought that they had had a dream but 
could not remember any contents (‘white dream’). If they remembered (any of the 
contents of) the dream experience, they were asked to “write down the dream in as 
much detail as you can remember”, which in Studies II and IV was followed by the 
following specification: “…(what happened, where, when, who was present, what 
you felt and thought)”. Such instructions were used to ensure a complete report of 
their experiences, while at the same time trying to avoid biasing the reports by 
drawing attention to only some contents of the experiences. Participants were asked 
to be as accurate, truthful, and detailed as possible, while at the same time restraining 
from changing, censoring, or interpreting the content. If participants wanted to 
comment on some aspects of the report, they were asked to do so by adding them in 
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parentheses or at the end of the report so that they would be clearly separate from 
the reported dream experience.  
Whereas Study III employed a pen and paper dream diary, in Studies II and IV 
an online dream diary was used instead. However, in the latter case, participants were 
asked to first make notes of their dream experiences using pen and paper while still 
lying in bed and, after having got up, to log onto the dream diary and fill it in. The 
online dream diary was used to ensure better quality reports and to monitor whether 
(and when) participants filled in the diary each day. If the participants did not log on 
to the online dream diary, an email reminder was sent. In case of several dreams per 
night, participants were instructed to report and rate them separately.  
6.3.2 Measurement of dream affect 
In all studies, the mDES (Fredrickson, 2013) was used for both ER (i.e., content 
analysis of narrative dream reports) and SR (i.e., as targeted probes) of dream affect. 
The same scale was used across different studies to ensure consistency and 
comparability of results.  
The mDES is an expanded version of the original Differential Emotions Scale 
(Izard, 1977). It consists of 20 discrete affect categories or items (each described by 
three adjectives): 10 for positive affect (PA) and 10 for negative affect (NA). This 
scale was used because it (a) includes a balanced number of PA and NA 
categories/items; (b) includes a wider range of affective, particularly positive, states; 
(c) includes both high- and low-arousal affective states; (d) enables the measurement 
of not only discrete but also dimensional affect (by aggregating the 10 PA and 10 
NA items into two separate subscales); and (e) has been used in emotion and well-
being research. Despite its name, the scale does not specifically measure emotions, 
but affective states (emotions and moods) in general.  
For Studies I, III, and V, a Finnish translation of the scale—and for Studies II 
and IV, a Swedish translation of the scale—was used. The scale was translated into 
Finnish and Swedish using the back-translation method (Brislin, 1970). 
6.3.2.1 Self-ratings of dream affect 
For SR, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they experienced each of 
the 20 mDES items on a scale from 0 (“I did not experience any of these feelings at 
all”) to 4 (“I experienced one or more of these feelings extremely much”). 
Because Studies I and II compared SR with ER, the two rating methods had to 
be comparable. Therefore, for these studies, the presence (vs absence), but not 
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intensity, of each affective state was analysed (i.e., score 0 denoted the absence, and 
scores 1–4 the presence, of affect). Because Studies IV and V did not focus on the 
comparison of the two rating methods per se but instead explored results obtained 
with the different methods as they are typically used, the intensity of affective states 
was analysed (which also included the score 0, denoting the absence of affect).  
In addition to analysing discrete affective states as such, two different subscales 
were created—one for PA and the other for NA—by either summing (Study I, II) or 
calculating the mean of (Study IV) the respective items. For Study V, only discrete 
items were analysed. The subscales had good reliability as measured with 
Cronbach’s alpha (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Reliability of self- and external ratings of dream affect 
 Study I Study II Study III 
Self-ratings (SR)    
Cronbach’s alpha PA .85a .93 N/A 
Cronbach’s alpha NA .84b .85 N/A 
External ratings (ER)   
Inter-rater percent 
agreement 
(identification of 
affective states) 
81.48 79.00 
 
92.43 (home) 
76.54 (lab) 
 
Cohen’s kappa 
(categorizing affective 
states) 
.84 .92 
 
.95 (home) 
.81 (lab) 
Note. aBased on nine items (‘Awe/Wonder/Amazement’ excluded due to poor item-to-total 
correlations). bBased on nine items (‘Embarrassed/Self-conscious/Blushing’ excluded due to 
poor item-to-total correlations). 
6.3.2.2  External ratings of dream affect 
All narrative (written and transcribed oral) dream reports were content analysed by 
two judges. Content analysis occurred in two stages. In the first stage, the judges 
independently identified all of the occurrences of affective states according to the 
specified criteria (see Table 5). Identification percent agreement was calculated 
between the raters. The affective states that the judges agreed on were directly 
accepted to the second stage, whereas the states the judges disagreed on were 
discussed and either accepted (upon agreement) or discarded (upon disagreement) 
from further analysis. In the second stage, the judges independently coded all of the 
accepted affective states by categorizing each of them into one of the 20 categories 
of mDES. In Studies II, III, and IV, an additional category—“Other”—was used for 
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affective states that the judges were not able to code into the existing 20 mDES 
categories. Coding inter-rater reliability was calculated using Cohen’s Kappa 
coefficient. The affective states that the judges agreed on were accepted to final 
analysis, whereas the ones the judges disagreed about were discussed and then either 
unanimously accepted or discarded from further analysis. Inter-rater reliability of 
both the identification and categorization of affective states was adequate in all 
studies (see Table 4). Explicitly expressed affective states (Criteria 1 or 2 in Table 
5) were distinguished from those inferred from behaviour (Criterion 3 in Table 5).  
ER reflect only the presence, not the intensity, of affective states. The judges did 
not rate the intensity of discrete affective states, because the validity of such ratings 
has been questioned (Domhoff, 1996). As was the case with SR, subscales were 
created for PA and NA by summing the respective items.  
For all dream reports, the length or word count of the reports was calculated by 
summing all dream-related words, while excluding repetition, utterances, fillers, 
waking correction, and commentaries (Antrobus, 1983).  
Table 5. Criteria for the identification of affective states in the narrative dream report used for 
external ratings 
Inclusion criteria: The affective state is identified when: 
(1) An affective state is explicitly expressed as experienced by the dream self (e.g., “I 
noticed that there were two shockingly big dogs and I was afraid of what was going to 
happen”); 
(2) An affective state is explicitly expressed, and it cannot be attributed to any other 
character besides the dream self (e.g., “Three of the puppies jumped on me which was 
terribly funny as they began biting each other’s tails”); 
(3) The dream self exhibits behaviour that clearly depicts an affective state, and the 
affective state is clearly inferable from the behaviour (or context) (i.e., only one prominent 
affective state can be interpreted from the outside as underlying the behaviour) (e.g., “He 
was quite a joker so we were laughing”). 
Exclusion criteria: The affective state is not identified: 
(1) If the dream self exhibits behaviour obviously related to an affective state, but the exact 
affective state has not been explicitly expressed, and the underlying affective state is not 
clearly and directly inferable from the expression (i.e., several different affective states can 
underlie the behaviour) (e.g., “I started to cry”, “I protested”); 
(2) If the affective state is mentioned twice within the same dream report as felt by the 
dream self and it obviously refers to the same target or situation, the affective state is coded 
only once (e.g., “the car was driving at a very high speed and this made me worried…I was 
worried because it was my father’s car”); 
(3) A general compliment is in question (e.g., “I said how nice of him to come”). 
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6.3.2.3 Dream affect variables 
Table 6 summarizes how the different dream affect variables used in the analyses—
and presented in the results section—were computed. These variables apply to both 
SR and ER in all studies with the following exception: in Study IV, SR of PA reflect 
the mean intensity of all PA items, and SR of NA reflect the mean intensity of all 
NA items, per dream. 
Table 6. Dream affect variables used in the studies 
Variable Description of computation 
PA per dream Sum of PA items (with a score > 0) in a dream 
NA per dream Sum of NA items (with a score > 0) in a dream 
Affect per dream PA + NA (+  “Other”a) 
Non-affective dream PA = 0 and NA = 0 (and “Other” = 0a) 
Affective dream PA > 0 or NA > 0 (or “Other”> 0a) 
Positive dream PA > NA 
Negative dream  PA < NA 
Balanced dream PA = NA 
Undetermined dream Dream containing only items categorized by judges as 
belonging to the “Other” categorya 
Note. a “Other” category was used in Studies II–IV for external ratings of items that the judges 
were not able to classify into any of the existing 20 categories of mDES. 
6.3.3 Measurement of waking well-being 
Study IV included measures of both mental ill-being and well-being. Ill-being 
measures included the measurement of symptoms of anxiety (Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder Scale; Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Löwe, 2006) and symptoms of 
depression (depression module of the Patient Health Questionnaire; Spitzer, 
Kroenke, & Williams, 1999). Well-being measures included the measurement of life 
satisfaction (the Satisfaction With Life Scale; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 
1985), domain satisfaction (the Brunnsviken Brief Quality of Life Scale; Lindner et 
al., 2016), EWB (Flourishing Scale; Diener, Wirtz, et al., 2009), and peace of mind 
(Peace of Mind Scale; Lee et al., 2013). Waking PA and NA were measured with 
three different scales—the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988), mDES (Fredrickson, 2013), and items from the 12-Point Affect 
Circumplex Scales (Yik et al., 2011)—to enable a comprehensive measurement of 
both high- and low-arousal affective states. Scores from the three different scales 
were combined in the analyses to form composite waking PA and NA scales.  
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6.3.4 Polysomnography/Electroencephalography 
Twenty-four single Ag/AgCI electrodes (Fp1/2, AF7/8, AF3/4, F7/8, F3/4, Fz, T7/8, 
C3/4, Cz, P7/8, P3/4, Pz, O1/2, Oz) were attached to the participants’ scalp according 
to the standard 10/10 system. Eye movements were monitored with four electrodes 
(EOG; two pairs of bipolar electrodes to measure vertical and horizontal eye 
movements), and muscle activity with two bipolar electrodes (EMG) placed on the 
chin. All (except the bipolar EOG and EMG) electrodes were referenced to the right 
mastoid. The ground electrode was on the forehead. The EEG signal was amplified 
(SynAmps Model 5083), notch-filtered at 50 Hz, digitized at 500 Hz, and recorded 
using NeuroScan equipment and software. All impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. 
For Study V, a two-minute pre-awakening EEG segment preceding the dream 
report was extracted from each REM episode. These REM sleep segments, together 
with evening and morning eight-minute baseline EEG segments from the two 
laboratory nights, were processed offline using MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., 
Natick, MA) and the EEGLAB toolbox version 14.1.1 (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) 
(see Figure 6). The EEG data were pre-processed following the guidelines of Smith, 
Reznik, Stewart, and Allen (2017) using custom-made scripts. Mean spectral power 
in the alpha frequency band (8–13 Hz) was obtained and averaged for each 
participant for all conditions (evening wakefulness, REM sleep, morning 
wakefulness). According to customary practices, FAA score was calculated by 
subtracting the natural log-transformed alpha power of the left hemisphere from that 
of the homologous right hemisphere electrode (i.e., ln[F4]–ln[F3]). Positive values 
reflect more alpha power in the right hemisphere (i.e., lower right-sided or greater 
left-sided fontal activity). Although the main analyses focused on FAA over the F4–
F3 electrodes, for control analyses FAA across all of the other homologous pairs 
(e.g., ln[Fp2]–ln[Fp1]) was calculated. Also, exploratory analyses in 1-Hz frequency 
bins from 1–45 Hz were conducted.  
6.4 Statistical analyses 
Table 7 gives an overview of the statistical tests used in the five original publications. 
The Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) was used to test the normality 
assumption. Normally distributed variables were analysed with parametric tests, 
whereas non-normally distributed variables were analysed with non-parametric tests. 
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Table 7. Overview of statistical tests used in the original publications 
 Study I Study II Study III Study IV Study V 
Parametric tests      
Independent samples t-
test 
✓    ✓ 
Paired samples t-test  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
One-way repeated 
measures ANOVA 
    ✓ 
Simple linear regression     ✓ 
Multiple linear regression     ✓ 
Multilevel regression: 
Linear mixed-effects 
model  
   ✓  
Pearson correlation (r)     ✓ 
Partial correlation (r)     ✓ 
Non-parametric tests      
Mann-Whitney U test  ✓ ✓   ✓ 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test  ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Spearman rank 
correlation (rs) 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Non-parametric partial 
correlation (rs) 
    ✓ 
Multilevel regression: 
Generalized linear mixed-
effects model 
   ✓  
Software used IBM  
SPSS  
(v. 20) 
IBM  
SPSS  
(v. 20) 
IBM  
SPSS  
(v. 20) 
R 
(v. 3.4.1) 
R 
(v. 3.4.1); 
IBM SPSS  
(v. 20) 
In Studies I, II, III, and V, measurement occasions (e.g., ratings of dream affect) 
were aggregated to the subject level for each condition separately. In addition, in 
Study III, to account for the different number of home and laboratory (early- and 
late-REM) dream reports, analyses were based on the mean (or median) percentage 
of affective dream reports out of all reports per participant. 
In Study IV, the nested design—measurement occasions (Level 1 data) nested 
within individuals (Level 2 data)—was accounted for and data analysed using 
multilevel regression models, also known as mixed model analysis or hierarchical 
linear modelling (Hox, 2010). Multilevel models are recommended for such nested 
data because they (a) do not assume the independence of measurement occasions, as 
compared with standard statistical tests; (b) can be used with unbalanced designs 
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(i.e., different number of measurement occasions for different individuals); and (c) 
capture both between- and within-subject variation simultaneously; all of which 
make estimates more precise (Aarts et al., 2014; Hox, 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002). Generalized linear mixed-effects models were used for outcome variables 
representing count data (i.e., ER of dream PA and NA), whereas linear mixed-effects 
models were used for continuous outcome variables (i.e., SR of dream PA and NA). 
Because the predictors were standardized and grand mean centred, the coefficients 
(β) presented below (see Section 7.2.1) reflect a magnitude of change in the outcome 
variable associated with an increase of one standard deviation in the predictor 
variable. The use of standardized coefficients makes it possible to compare different 
predictors (measured on a different scale).  
Multicollinearity—a strong correlation between predictors—can be problematic 
in regression analyses with multiple predictors. Therefore, collinearity diagnostics, 
such as the variance inflation factor and tolerance, were performed. These 
demonstrated sufficient independence among predictors (Field, Miles, & Field, 
2012; Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999; Yu, Jiang, & Land, 2015).  
All statistical tests were two-tailed. For non-parametric tests, significance was 
calculated using the exact method, which is recommended for small sample sizes 
and poorly distributed data (Field et al., 2012). In all analyses, p-values less than 
0.05 were considered statistically significant. 
Effect sizes (ES) were calculated using Cohen’s d (t-tests), Pearson’s r (r=Z/√; 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, Mann-Whitney U test; Field et al., 2012) and partial eta 
squared (ηp²; ANOVA). In correlation and linear regression analyses, r and rs values 
indicate ES. In multilevel models, standardized coefficients (β) provide information 
concerning the magnitude of the effect (Lorah, 2018). In the results section below 
(see Chapter 7), I present ES, together with the p-values, for the main findings. The 
following benchmarks, proposed by Cohen (1988), can be used to interpret the ES 
(see Table 8).  
Table 8. Interpretation of effect size values (Cohen, 1988) 
 Pearson’s r Cohen’s d 
Small  .1 0.2 
Medium .3 0.5 
Large .5 0.8 
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7. Results 
7.1 Phenomenology of dream affect: Impact of study 
methodology 
Studies I–III investigated how results regarding the phenomenology of dream affect 
depend on the particular methods used, specifically, whether dream affect is measured 
with SR or ER and whether data are collected in the home or a sleep laboratory 
environment. Table 9 presents the percentages of dreams rated as non-affective and 
affective across the three studies. In the following sections, the main findings of these 
studies are presented. Dreams and dream reports classified as having a balanced or an 
undetermined affective tone are not discussed further, because these are not central to 
understanding the results or conclusions of the studies. 
Table 9. Percentages of non-affective and affective dreams in Studies I, II, and III 
 Study I  Study II  Study III 
 Lab  Home  Home Lab All 
Lab 
Early 
Lab 
Late 
 N = 115  N = 552  N = 151 N = 120 N = 38 N = 82 
 SR ER  SR ER  ER ER ER ER 
Non-affective dreams  0.0 71.3  2.5 52.2  54.6 70.7 82.2 62.2 
Affective dreams  100.0 28.7  97.5 47.8  45.4 29.3 17.8 37.8 
Positive dreams 79.1 9.6  55.8 12.5  2.6 8.4 4.4 9.5 
Negative dreams 12.2 11.3  35.3 28.1  36.7 12.6 8.3 18.5 
Balanced dreams 8.7 1.7  6.3 5.1  3.1 3.2 1.7 3.3 
Undetermined  N/A 6.1  N/A 2.2  3.1 5.1 3.3 6.5 
7.1.1 Comparison of self- and external ratings of dream affect 
Studies I and II compared SR and ER of dream affect. Although the two studies 
differed in data collection environment (Study I: sleep laboratory; Study II: home 
setting), dream sampling procedure (Study I: REM awakenings throughout the night; 
Study II: morning awakenings) and included different groups of participants and 
numbers of dreams, they yielded similar findings.  
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With SR, as compared with ER, a significantly larger number of dreams were 
rated as affective (ES for Study I: r = .62, p < .001; ES for Study II: r = .61, p < .001) 
and positive (ES for Study I: r = .62, p < .001; ES for Study II: r = .59, p < .001) (see 
Figure 7). Whereas with SR (almost) all of the dreams were rated as affective (100 % 
in Study I; 97.5 % in Study II), with ER only approximately one-third (28.7 % in 
Study I) or half (47.8 % in Study II) of the reports were rated as affective (see Table 
9). While with SR more than half of the dreams were rated as positive (79.1 % in 
Study I; 55.8 % in Study II), with ER only about ten percent (9.6 % in Study I; 
12.5 % in Study II) of the reports were rated as positive. The number of negative 
dreams was similar with the two rating methods. In Study I, there were no significant 
differences between SR and ER (ES r = .05, p > .05), with both ratings yielding 
approximately ten percent negative dreams (12.1% with SR, 11.3% with ER). 
Although in Study II significantly more dreams were rated as negative with SR, as 
compared with ER, the difference was small (ES r = .25, p = .017), with both 
methods resulting in about one-third of negative dreams (35.3 % with SR; 28.1 % 
with ER). In addition, with SR dreams were rated to contain more PA and NA than 
with ER (ES for Study I: rPA = .62, rNA = .62, ps < .001; ES for Study II: rPA = .62, 
rNA = .62, ps < .001), although the difference was larger for PA than for NA (ES for 
Study I: r = .62, p < .001; ES for Study II: d = 0.68, p < .001).  
Figure 7. Mean number of affective dreams and affective states per dream, as evaluated with 
self-ratings (SR) and external ratings (ER). PA = positive affect. NA = negative affect. Study 
I: PA (min = 0; max = 9), NA (min = 0; max = 9). Study II: PA (min = 0, max = 10), NA (min = 0, 
max = 10). Error bars represent standard deviation. *p < .05. ***p < .001.  
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Thus, the two methods differed mostly in the estimation of positive dreams and 
PA per dream. This was supported by results showing that the NA subscales of SR 
and ER were positively correlated (Study I: rs = .52, p = .032; Study II: rs = .49, 
p = .001), whereas no significant relationships were observed between the PA 
subscales (Study I: rs = .18, p = .498; Study II: rs = .22, p = .152) (see Table 10). 
Table 10. Intercorrelations between positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) subscales 
of self-ratings (SR) and external ratings (ER) 
 ER PA ER NA SR PA SR NA 
ER PA 
 
1.00ab    
ER NA .49*a 
.49***b 
1.00ab   
SR PA .18a 
.22b 
–.02a 
.02b 
1.00ab  
SR NA .24a 
.23b 
.52*a 
.49***b 
.28a 
.25b 
1.00ab 
Note. aStudy I (Sikka, Valli, Virta, & Revonsuo, 2014). bStudy II (Sikka, Feilhauer, Valli, & 
Revonsuo, 2017). *p < .05. ***p < .001. 
Regarding discrete affective states, almost all of the different affect items were 
rated to occur more frequently with SR than with ER (Study I: 12 out of 20, ES 
r = .47 – .61, ps < .05; Study II: 20 out of 20, ES r = .45 – .60, ps < .001). Thus, the 
differences between SR and ER were not due to specific affective states. The same 
items were among the most frequently rated with both methods across the two 
studies: ‘Interested/Alert/Curious’, ‘Joyful/Glad/Happy’, and ‘Amused/Fun-
loving/Giggly’ among the PA items, and ‘Angry/Irritated/Annoyed’ and 
‘Stressed/Nervous/Overwhelmed’ among the NA items. In Study II, 
‘Scared/Fearful/Afraid’ was also frequently rated among the NA items (with both 
SR and ER), but it was less frequent in Study I.  
Considered separately, the two measurement methods provided a very different 
picture regarding the affective nature of dreams. With SR, there were significantly 
more positive than negative dreams (ES for Study I: r = .62, p < .001; ES for Study 
II: r = .31, p = .003) and more PA than NA per dream (ES for Study I: r = .62, 
p < .001; ES for Study II: d = 0.55, p = .001). With ER, however, the number of 
positive and negative dreams (ES r = .09, p > .05), as well as of PA and NA per 
dream (ES r = .15, p > .05), were either not significantly different (Study I), or 
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negative dreams (ES r = .38, p < .001) and NA per dream (ES r = .39, p < .001) 
prevailed (Study II). Thus, whereas with SR dreams appeared to be mostly positive, 
with ER they appeared to be either rather balanced (Study I) or mostly negative 
(Study II).  
Study II showed that whether ER of dream reports appeared to be mostly 
negative or to have a more balanced affective tone depended on whether the reports 
were provided by women or men. Women expressed more NA in their dream reports 
than men (ES r = .33, p = .030) and, as a result, had also more negative dream reports 
in general (ES r = .33, p = .029)18 (see Figure 8). When analysing results for men 
and women separately, an interesting pattern of results emerged. Women had more 
negative than positive dream reports (ES r = .47, p < .001) and more NA than PA 
per report (ES r = .47, p < .001), whereas the number of positive and negative dream 
reports (ES r = .23, p = .203) and PA and NA per dream report (ES r = .18, p = .336) 
was balanced for men. This difference could not be explained by report length, 
because the reports of men and women did not differ in that regard (ES r = .06). 
Further analyses demonstrated that the NA scales of SR and ER were strongly 
positively correlated for women (rs = .70, p < .001) but not for men (rs = .12, 
p = .653). This suggests that how women rated negative dream affect corresponded 
better to how they expressed it in their dream reports and indicates that men may 
have underreported NA in their dream reports. No significant gender differences 
were observed in Study I, although women tended to express more NA in their dream 
reports in that study as well19. 
 
18  The total number of dream reports provided by women (M = 12.61, SD = 5.92, 
Mdn = 11.00) and men (M = 12.44, SD = 5.54, Mdn = 11.50) did not differ (Mann Whitney 
U = 221.00, Z = –0.073, p = .947, r = .011). 
19 Although women (M = 0.25, SD = 0.24, Mdn = 0.20) expressed more NA in their dream 
reports than men (M = 0.06, SD = 0.12, Mdn = 0.00), the difference was not statistically 
significant (Mann Whitney U = 17.500, Z = –1.804, p = .088, r = .44). 
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Figure 8. Average number of dream reports and affect expressed in dream reports separately 
for women (N = 28) and men (N = 16). Error bars represent standard deviation.   *p < .05. 
***p < .001.  
As shown above (see Table 9), dreams in Study II appeared relatively more 
affective and negative than in Study I, particularly with regard to ER. Whereas in 
Study I only about one-third (28.7 %) of the dream reports were rated to contain 
affective states, in Study II almost half (47.8 %) of the reports were rated as affective. 
While in Study I only about ten percent (11.3 %) of reports were negatively 
valenced, in Study II more than twice as many were (28.1 %). This raises the 
question of what may underlie the differences between the two studies. One possible 
explanation is differences in reporting modality: whereas in Study I dream reports 
were provided orally, in Study II they were written down. However, the fact that SR 
also yielded a larger percentage of negative dreams (12.2 % in Study I; 35.3 % in 
Study II) makes this explanation is unlikely. This brings us to the second possible 
explanation—differences in the data collection environment. Whereas in Study I data 
were collected in the sleep laboratory, in Study II data were collected in participants’ 
home environments. Are home dreams more affective and more negatively valenced 
than laboratory dreams? The results of Study III help shed light on this question. 
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7.1.2 Comparison of home and laboratory dream reports  
Study III compared the affective content of dream reports collected at home upon 
morning awakenings with those collected in the sleep laboratory upon early- and 
late-REM sleep awakenings. To this end, home and laboratory dream reports were 
obtained from the same group of participants and rated by external judges using the 
mDES.  
As Studies I and II suggested, Study III showed that there were significantly 
more affective home dream reports (45.4 %) than affective laboratory dream reports 
(29.3 %) (ES d = 0.58, p = .026). However, this difference appeared because of the 
smaller percentage of affective early-REM laboratory reports (17.8 %, ES r = .56, 
p < .001), whereas the percentage of affective late-REM laboratory dream reports 
(37.8 %, ES r = .18, p = .296) was similar to that obtained in the home setting (see 
Figure 9). Similarly, home dream reports contained significantly more affect per 
dream only when compared to early-REM laboratory dream reports (ES r = .56, 
p < .001), not when compared to late-REM laboratory reports (ES r = .19, p = .258) 
(see Figure 10). This suggests that it is time of night—rather than the environment 
per se—that underlies the enhanced affectivity of home—as compared to 
laboratory—dream reports.  
However, home dream reports contained more affect per 100 words than either 
early- (ES r = .53, p = .001) or late-REM (ES r = .51, p = .001) laboratory dream 
reports (Figure 10). Such analyses are often used to control for the length of the 
report but can also be taken to reflect the density of affect in a report. These results 
show that home dream reports contain a higher density of affect.  
There were more negatively valenced dream reports in the home (36.7 %) than 
laboratory (12.6 %) setting (ES r = .52, p < .001). Specifically, the percentage of 
negative home dream reports was higher than that of early- (8.3 %, ES r = .56, 
p < .001) and late-REM (18.5 %, ES r = .39, p = .017) reports (see Figure 9). Home 
dream reports also contained more NA than laboratory reports overall (ES r = .52, 
p = .001) or early- (ES r = .56, p < .001) or late-REM (ES r = .42, p = .008) 
laboratory reports individually (see Figure 10).  
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Figure 9. Percentage of affective dream reports in the home and laboratory environments. 
Error bars represent standard deviation. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Adapted from Sikka, 
Revonsuo, Sandman, Tuominen, and Valli, 2018, p. 6. 
 
Figure 10. Number of affective states per dream report in the home and laboratory 
environments. Error bars represent standard deviation. **p < .01. ***p < .001. Adapted from 
Sikka, Revonsuo, Sandman, Tuominen, and Valli, 2018, p. 6. 
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Interestingly, when home dream reports were compared to the last laboratory 
dream of the night before awakening (i.e., the latest REM report), differences in the 
percentage of negative dream reports and the number of NA per dream report were 
non-significant. On the one hand, this seems to suggest that differences in the 
negative affectivity of home and laboratory dream reports are due to the time of 
night. On the other hand, ES were still of medium magnitude (negative dream 
reports: ES r = .29, p = .087; NA per dream report: ES r = .32, p = .056). Due to the 
small sample size, we must be cautious when making any inferences based on this 
finding. 
Regarding discrete affective states, the two settings differed only with respect to 
fear (item ‘Scared/Fearful/Afraid’), which was more prevalent in home than 
laboratory dream reports (ES r = .45, p = .047). Fear was also among the most 
frequently reported affective states in Study II, which was conducted in the home 
environment.  
When looking separately at the reports obtained in the two settings, as in Study 
II, ER of home dream reports demonstrated a preponderance of negative dreams (ES 
r = .53, p < .001) and NA per dream (ES r = .53, p < .001). As in Study I, ER of 
laboratory dream reports yielded a rather balanced amount of positive and negative 
dreams (ES r = .14, p = .445), as well as PA and NA per dream (ES r = .0.15, 
p = .40220). However, regarding the latter, it is important to note that the laboratory 
samples of Studies I and III overlapped (although different judges rated the 
laboratory reports for Study I and for Study III).  
7.2 Correlates of dream affect 
7.2.1 Dream affect and waking well-being 
Study IV investigated the relationship between dream affect and waking well-being. 
Participants’ waking mental ill-being (i.e., symptoms of anxiety, depression) and 
well-being (i.e., life satisfaction, domain satisfaction, PA, NA, EWB, peace of mind) 
were measured and related to the affective content of subsequent dreams reported 
and rated in the home environment during a 21-day period.  
 
20 The number of PA (M = 0.16, SD = 0.18, Mdn = 0.11) and NA (M = 0.21, SD = 0.28, 
Mdn = 0.06) in laboratory dream reports was not significantly different (Wilcoxon Z = –.890, 
p = .402). 
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Because SR and ER yield different results regarding dream affectivity (as shown 
in Studies I–II), they may also relate differently to ill-being and well-being measures. 
Therefore, both SR and ER of dream affect were included in the analyses. Multilevel 
regression models showed that when controlling for all of the other ill-being and 
well-being measures21, the scale measuring peace of mind predicted ER of dream 
PA (β = 0.405, CI [0.102, 0.709], p = .009; see also Figure 11), whereas the scale 
measuring symptoms of anxiety predicted both ER (β = 0.427, CI [0.188, 0.673], 
p < .001; see also Figure 11) and SR (β = 0.122, CI [0.008, 0.236], p = .041) of 
dream NA. Thus, SR and ER of dream affect were indeed differently associated with 
waking well-being.  
 
Figure 11. Average number of positive and negative affect per dream report, as measured 
with external ratings, in people with low versus high levels of peace of mind and anxiety. 
Participants were divided into groups using median split on the Peace of Mind Scale, or a cut-
off value of 5 on the Generalized Anxiety Disorder Scale. The groups were formed for 
illustrative purposes only. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Adapted from 
Sikka, Pesonen, and Revonsuo, 2018, p. 5. 
7.2.2 Dream affect and frontal alpha asymmetry 
Study V investigated the EEG correlates of dream affect, specifically, whether 
FAA—the relative difference in alpha power between the right and left frontal 
 
21 Analyses also controlled for gender, age, and length of dream report. 
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areas—during REM sleep and during evening resting wakefulness is related to dream 
affect. The study focused specifically on SR of anger (as measured with the mDES 
item ‘Angry/Irritated/Annoyed’) and interest (as measured with the mDES item 
‘Interested/Alert/Curious’). ER of affect were too low to enable enough power for 
all the analyses. Dream anger and dream interest were chosen because (a) in Study I 
these were rated as the most intensely and frequently experienced affective states in 
dreams and (b) anger and interest are both high-approach affective states, but with 
opposite valence (negative vs positive), which enabled us to test the three different 
theoretical models regarding the role of FAA in affective processing.  
Results showed that FAA during REM sleep predicted SR of dream anger 
(R2 = .435, r = .660, p = .004; see A in Figure 12) but not SR of dream interest 
(R2 = .198, r = .444, p = .074). The relationship was significant only over the F4–F3 
electrode sites. Moreover, further analyses demonstrated that this relationship was 
specifically driven by the right hemisphere region (F4) (r = .636, p = .003; see B in 
Figure 12) and was specific to the lower alpha band (7–11 Hz) only (see D in Figure 
12). As alpha power is assumed to reflect decreased activity in underlying brain areas 
(Jensen & Mazaheri, 2010; Klimesch, 2012; Klimesch et al., 2007), the results 
suggest that reduced activity over the right-frontal region F4 (i.e., indicated by higher 
alpha power) is related to dream anger. Exploratory analyses demonstrated that the 
only other affect item associated with FAA over the F4–F3 was 
‘Hate/Distrust/Suspicion’ (r = .572, p = .016), which provides further support for the 
specificity of the relationship. Interestingly, ER of dream anger were also associated 
with alpha power over F4 (r = .535, p = .033).  
In addition, FAA was positively correlated across wakefulness and REM sleep 
(rs = .637 – .720, p < .01), and FAA recorded during evening pre-sleep wakefulness 
predicted SR of dream anger (R2 = .411, r = .641, p = .006; see C in Figure 12). Thus, 
FAA appears to be a relatively stable measure that is associated with dream anger. 
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Figure 12. Dream anger and its relationship to frontal alpha asymmetry (FAA). (A) 
Relationship between dream anger and FAA during REM sleep. The grey area denotes the 
95 % confidence interval. (B) Partial correlation coefficients between dream anger and log-
transformed alpha power over individual electrode sites, while controlling for the average 
whole-head alpha power. (C) Relationship between dream anger and FAA during evening 
resting wakefulness. The grey area denotes the 95 % confidence interval. (D) Partial 
correlation coefficients between dream anger and log-transformed alpha power over the F4 
electrode in 1-Hz bins. Blue-coloured bins marked with asterisks denote statistically significant 
correlations after the Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate correction (adjusted p-
value = .0045). T/A = Theta/Alpha. Adapted from Sikka, Revonsuo, Noreika, and Valli, 2019, 
p. 4779. 
 87 
8. Discussion 
The overall aim of the empirical studies carried out in the framework of this PhD 
thesis was to investigate the phenomenology and correlates of dream affect and how 
results regarding these are influenced by study methodology. Five studies were 
conducted: Studies I–III focused on the phenomenology—and Studies IV and V on 
the correlates—of dream affect.  
In this chapter, I discuss the results of these studies in light of existing literature 
and provide possible explanations for—and address the ramifications of—the main 
findings. I then discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of the studies as a 
whole. Finally, I point out limitations of the studies and provide recommendations 
for future research on dream affect. 
8.1 Phenomenology of dream affect: Impact of study 
methodology 
8.1.1 Self- versus external ratings of dream affect 
Studies I and II compared SR and ER of dream affect. The results obtained with 
these two methods of measurement differed greatly. With SR, as compared with ER, 
a larger number of dreams were rated to contain affect. These findings are well in 
line with the home dream diary studies of Schredl and Doll (1998) and Kahan and 
LaBerge (1996), as well as with the home and laboratory studies that have used either 
ER (e.g., Domhoff, 2018; Hsu & Yu, 2016; Snyder, 1970) or SR (Nielsen et al., 
1991; St-Onge et al., 2005; Yu, 2007) as the main method of measurement. 
Regarding valence, with SR a larger number of dreams were rated as positive. 
Moreover, although with SR dreams were rated to contain more PA and NA, the 
difference was larger for PA. Thus, ER and SR differed mostly in the estimation of 
positive dreams and PA in dreams. Similar conclusions were reached in Schredl and 
Doll (1998), and Röver and Schredl (2017).  
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Although the measures used for SR and ER were reliable, the fact that they have 
yielded different results challenges their validity. Both SR and ER are assumed to 
measure the same phenomenon or construct—dream affect. This means that they 
should display (at least some degree of) convergent validity. Convergent validity is 
a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for construct validity (i.e., whether and 
to what extent we can measure what we intend to measure; Campbell & Fiske, 1959; 
Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). A high level of convergent validity demonstrates that our 
measures can capture the phenomenon of interest, and as such, we can make 
meaningful inferences based on our data. No or low convergent validity, on the other 
hand, makes it questionable whether our data actually reflect the underlying 
phenomenon (Carlson & Herdman, 2012). Convergent validity can be indirectly 
evaluated by looking at the extent to which results obtained with the two measures—
SR and ER—converge. However, it is also possible to directly assess convergent 
validity. One approach is to examine bivariate correlations between measures. For 
convergent validity to be demonstrated, different measures of the same construct 
should be sufficiently correlated. Although there are no exact thresholds, correlations 
less than r = .50 are typically considered too low; however, for more precise 
measurement, correlation coefficients higher than r = .85 are required (Carlson & 
Herdman, 2012). 
To directly assess convergent validity, we can examine intercorrelations between 
SR and ER with respect to the measurement of PA and NA in dreams across the four 
existing studies (i.e., Studies I–II of the present thesis; Röver & Schredl, 2017; 
Schredl & Doll, 1998). To compare the different studies, we must be more detailed 
regarding the measures for SR and ER, specifically, whether content analysis or 
global ratings have been used, and whether discrete or dimensional affect has been 
measured. The results of Studies I and II showed that whereas the NA subscales of 
ER (i.e., content analysis of discrete affect; ER-CA-Dis) and SR (i.e., global ratings 
of discrete affect; SR-GS-Dis) were positively correlated, PA subscales were not 
significantly correlated (see Table 11). Thus, whereas both ER and SR converge, at 
least to some extent, on the measurement of NA, they diverge on the measurement 
of PA. This suggests that research findings regarding NA are more consistent, which 
is indeed reflected in the results of Studies IV and V (see Sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2). 
Inadequate convergent validity in the measurement of PA means that we must be 
cautious when interpreting the findings. Schredl and colleagues (Röver & Schredl, 
2017; Schredl & Doll, 1998) demonstrated that when the same global dimensional 
rating scales were used for ER (i.e., ER-GS-Dim) and SR (i.e., SR-GS-Dim), 
satisfactory positive correlations between the measures were obtained for both PA 
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and NA. However, when detailed content analysis of discrete affect was used for ER 
(i.e., ER-CA-Dis) but global dimensional rating scales used for SR (i.e., SR-GS-
Dim), correlations were low for both PA and NA (see Table 11).  
Table 11. Convergent validity between self-ratings (SR) and external ratings (ER) in the 
measurement of positive and negative dream affect, as evidenced by zero-order correlations 
between the measures across the four existing studies 
 SR-GS-Dim SR-GS-Dis 
Negative affect in dreams 
ER-CA-Dis 0.29 (p = .0007)a 0.52 (p = .032)c; 0.49 (p = .001)d 
ER-GS-Dim 0.67 (p = .0001)a; 0.57 (p < .0001)b  
Positive affect in dreams 
ER-CA-Dis 0.36 (p = .0001)a 0.18 (p = .498)c; 0.22 (p = .152)d 
ER-GS-Dim 0.56 (p = .0001)a; 0.48 (p < .0001)b  
Note. aSchredl and Doll (1998); bRöver and Schredl (2017); cSikka, Valli, Virta, and Revonsuo, 
2014; dSikka, Feilhauer, Valli, & Revonsuo, 2017. SR-GS-Dim = self-ratings using global 
rating scales of dimensional affect; SR-GS-Dis = self-ratings using a global rating scale of 
discrete affect; ER-CA-Dis = external ratings using content analysis of discrete affect; ER-GS-
Dim = external ratings using global rating scales of dimensional affect.  
Together, these results offer four possible explanations for low convergent 
validity. First, low convergence may result from the fact that the measures used for 
SR and ER differ not only in the type of report collected and in who rates dream 
affect but in several other aspects as well (see Table 12). In particular, whereas for 
ER the collected data are in the form of narrative dream reports, for SR the data are 
in the form of evaluations of (the memories of) dream experiences. Also, whereas 
the unit of analysis for ER using content analysis is every occurrence of affect in the 
dream report, for SR it is the dream experience as a whole (or globally). Such global 
ratings involve aggregation—combining multiple episodes of momentary 
experiences into one rating (Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999). For example, in the dream 
report provided at the beginning of this thesis (see p. 14), the dreamer would have to 
evaluate to what extent he or she experienced fear or excitement across the whole 
dream experience. It is rarely acknowledged that this aggregation process can be 
biased. Research on waking affect has demonstrated that aggregated end-of-day 
ratings of both PA and NA are more intense, as compared with momentary ratings 
(Miron-Shatz et al., 2009; Parkinson, Briner, Reynolds, & Totterdell, 1995; cf. 
Thomas & Diener, 1990). Similarly, evaluating a dream as a whole may yield higher 
levels of affect (intensity) than evaluating every episode of affect. In summary, a 
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more fine-grained comparison of ER and SR shows that if the same scales are used 
for SR and ER (i.e., SR-GS-Dim vs ER-GS-Dim), convergence is adequate. If SR 
and ER differ in one or several aspects (i.e., SR-GS-Dim vs ER-CA-Dis), 
convergence is low. Thus, differences in measures used for SR and ER may be one 
reason underlying discrepant findings. However, this explanation fails to explain 
why low convergence specifically concerns the measurement of discrete PA (i.e., 
when ER-CA-Dis and SR-GS-Dis are compared). 
Table 12. Variation in methods used for self- and external ratings of dream affect 
 ER-CA-Dis ER-GS-Dim SR-GS-Dis SR-GS-Dim 
Type of report Narrative 
report 
Narrative 
report 
Targeted 
probes 
Targeted 
probes 
Rater External 
judges 
External 
judges 
Dreamer Dreamer 
Type of scale Nominal Ordinal  Ordinal  Ordinal 
Unit of analysis Every 
occurrence of 
affective state 
in the dream 
report 
Dream report 
as a whole (or 
globally) 
(Memories of 
the) dream 
experience as 
a whole (or 
globally) 
(Memories of 
the) dream 
experience as 
a whole (or 
globally) 
Instructions to 
raters 
Explicitly 
expressed 
affect 
Explicitly and 
implicitly 
expressed 
affect 
Experienced 
affect 
Experienced 
affect 
Model of affect Discrete Dimensional Discrete  Dimensional  
Quality of affect mDES 
 
PA, NA mDES PA, NA 
Aspect of affect Presence Intensity Intensity Intensity 
Note. ER-CA-Dis = external ratings using content analysis of discrete affect; ER-GS-Dim = 
external ratings using global rating scales of dimensional affect; SR-GS-Dis = self-ratings 
using a global rating scale of discrete affect; SR-GS-Dim = self-ratings using global rating 
scales of dimensional affect; mDES = modified Differential Emotions Scale; NA = negative 
affect; PA = positive affect. 
Second, it may be more difficult to achieve adequate convergent validity for the 
measurement of discrete affect, particularly for discrete PA. Strauch and Meier 
(1996) showed that whereas negative experiences are expressed in dream reports as 
discrete “emotions” (e.g., fear, anger), positive experiences are expressed as more 
general dimensional “mood states” (e.g., positive, pleased), although discrete affect 
does not necessarily entail emotions, and dimensional affect mood. In addition, when 
describing positive experiences, people may refer to situations (e.g., “everything was 
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very beautiful”, see report on p. 14), rather than how the positive experiences make 
them feel (e.g., in awe) (Sikka et al., 2014, 2017). As a result, certain types (i.e., 
emotions) and models (i.e., discrete) of positive affective experiences may be 
underreported in narrative dream reports, leading to lower ratings of PA with ER, 
especially with content analysis of discrete affect (i.e., ER-CA-Dis). On the other 
hand, research on waking affect has demonstrated that different discrete PA items 
are less differentiated or granular than NA items, that is, PA items are more blended 
with each other (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). Also, people tend to evaluate neutral 
events as slightly positive, a phenomenon known as the ‘positivity offset’ (Ito & 
Cacioppo, 2005). Consequently, people may evaluate the same dream event or 
experience using several discrete PA items, leading to the over-representation of PA 
with SR.  
Third, as the findings of Schredl and colleagues (Röver & Schredl, 2017; Schredl 
& Doll, 1998) show, convergent validity may be higher if judges can infer affect 
from the content of the dream report. However, this may only pertain to the 
measurement of affective dimensions. Nevertheless, even in the case of the adequate 
convergent validity of global dimensional scales, ER still reflects less (intense) PA 
in dreams than does SR. 
Finally, it may be that one or both measures do not reflect the underlying 
construct or that they reflect different aspects of it—the verbal expression of affect 
or affective language (ER) versus the evaluation of affect (SR).  
Research on waking affect could help shed light on this issue. However, it is 
surprising that the comparison of SR and ER has received little attention outside of 
dream research, despite both of these measures being actively used by researchers in 
other fields. Among the existing studies on waking affect, results are mixed. Similar 
to the findings of the current thesis, some studies have reported positive correlations 
between SR and ER of NA, but not of PA (Tov, Ng, Lin, & Qiu, 2013). Other studies 
have found positive correlations between SR and ER of PA, but not of NA (Kahn, 
Tobin, Massey, & Anderson, 2007). And, several studies have failed to find any 
correlations between SR and ER of PA or NA (Bantum & Owen, 2009; Grysman, 
Merrill, & Fivush, 2016; Owen et al., 2006; Sun, Schwartz, Son, Kern, & Vazire, 
2019). Thus, low convergence between SR and ER also applies to the measurement 
of waking affect.  
The study of waking affect has the advantage that it is possible to validate the 
measures using a multimethod approach including other concurrent measures, such 
as informant ratings, psychophysiological responses, and behavioural (facial) 
expression, which is virtually impossible in the study of dream affect. Such studies 
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on waking affect have demonstrated that SR of waking affect are positively 
associated with informant ratings (e.g., Diener, Smith, & Fujita, 1995). Also, 
response biases (i.e., measurement error) have been shown to exert only a negligible 
influence on SR of waking affect (Schimmack, 2003; Schimmack et al., 2002). As a 
result, SR of affect are considered valid measures of affective experiences in 
wakefulness (Mauss & Robinson, 2009), albeit not without criticism (e.g., Heavey, 
Hurlburt, & Lefforge, 2012; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015; Scherer, 2005). Moreover, 
abundant research on the structure of affect has demonstrated that PA and NA are 
either independent (i.e., not correlated) or negatively correlated (for a review, see 
Schimmack, 2008). The findings of Studies I and II showed that SR of PA and NA 
in dreams were not significantly correlated, whereas ER of PA and NA in dreams 
were strongly positively correlated (see Table 10). These findings suggest that SR of 
dream affect are more in line with results obtained in the study of waking affect. 
However, more research on the comparison of SR and ER of both dream and waking 
affect is needed to establish whether low convergent validity results from 
measurement issues or from our assumption—that we are measuring the same 
construct with both SR and ER—being incorrect.  
Nevertheless, differences between SR and ER of dream affect—particularly with 
regard to PA—are consistent across studies, irrespective of the environment the data 
have been collected in (home vs lab) or the particular affect rating scale (e.g., 
dimensional or discrete) used. These differences imply that we must be careful when 
drawing conclusions about the overall affective nature of dreams using only one type 
of measurement method. As Studies I and II showed, with SR dreams appeared to 
be mostly affective, whereas with ER they appeared mostly non-affective. With SR 
dreams appeared to be positive in both settings (home and laboratory), whereas with 
ER dreams appeared to be either relatively balanced (laboratory; Study I) or mostly 
negative (home; Study II). Moreover, Study II further demonstrated that results 
regarding the affective nature of dream reports depend not only on the measurement 
method but also on the gender of participants. Specifically, whether dream reports 
appeared negatively biased or balanced differed depending on whether they were 
provided by women or men, respectively. Because the empirical literature on gender 
differences in dream affect is controversial (e.g., Dale, Lortie-Lussier, Wong, & De 
Koninck, 2016; Hall & Van de Castle, 1966), more research is needed to tease out 
the reasons for these discrepancies. Regardless, all these differences help explain 
inconsistent results—whether dreams are mostly affective or mostly non-affective, 
negatively biased or not—in the empirical literature. 
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The findings of Studies I and II also have implications beyond the field of dream 
research. In the age of big data, the automatic detection of affective states from 
various narratives, such as social media posts in Facebook or Twitter (known as 
sentiment analysis), is becoming increasingly popular, and it is used to predict, 
among other things, the well-being of individuals (e.g., Mohammad, 2016). To be 
able to interpret such findings, it is important to have a clear understanding of what 
exactly affect expressed in narratives reflects and to what extent it converges with 
SR of affect.  
8.1.2 Dream affect in home versus laboratory dream reports 
Study III compared affect expressed in dream reports collected upon morning 
awakenings at home with those collected upon multiple REM awakenings in the 
sleep laboratory. Obtained results corroborate previous studies using similar non-
constant sampling and reporting procedures: dreams appear to be more affective and 
more negative at home than in the laboratory (Foulkes, 1979, Study 4; Okuma et al., 
1075; St-Onge et al., 2005). Although Study III used only ER of dream affect, the 
findings are very similar to a previous study using SR (St-Onge et al., 2005). This 
suggests that observed differences in the affective content of home and laboratory 
dream reports are likely not due to the particular affect rating method used. 
However, when home morning reports were compared separately with early- and 
late-REM laboratory reports, results showed that it is not the environment per se, but 
rather the time of night, that explains the enhanced affectivity of home dream reports. 
This indicates that home dreams appear more affective because they represent 
(mostly) late-REM dreams. At the same time, home dream reports contained a higher 
density of affect than early- and late-REM laboratory reports. This is most likely due 
to differences in reporting modality: home dream reports were written down, 
whereas laboratory dream reports were provided orally. It has been shown that 
written, as compared with oral, reports have higher lexical density, that is, the same 
information is condensed into fewer words (Casagrande & Cortini, 2008).  
Results regarding negative affectivity were more controversial. On the one hand, 
home dream reports were more negative than either early- or late-REM dream 
reports in the laboratory. This seems to speak against the time of night effect. On the 
other hand, the difference between home and early-REM laboratory reports was 
larger than that between home and late-REM laboratory reports. Perhaps dreams 
become more negative across every sleep cycle as the night proceeds, with the most 
negative dreams in the morning just before awakening (cf. Cartwright et al., 1998). 
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This means that dream reports obtained upon morning awakenings at home and in 
the laboratory should yield similar findings, as has indeed been demonstrated 
previously (Foulkes, 1979, Study 3; Weisz & Foulkes, 1970). The lack of significant 
differences between home dream reports and the latest REM dream reports found in 
Study III also seems to support the time of night effect. However, if dreams become 
increasingly negative over the course of the night, late-REM laboratory dream 
reports should be more negative than early-REM laboratory dream reports, 
something that was not found in Study III, or in other previous studies (e.g., Fosse 
et al., 2001; Hall, 1966). 
Another explanation is that dreams may become more negative over the course 
of the same sleep cycle, meaning that the longer the REM sleep stage lasts, the more 
negative the dream becomes. Merritt et al. (1994) have demonstrated that dreams do 
indeed progress towards increased negativity. Perhaps laboratory dream reports had 
less negative affectivity, because REM sleep—and the corresponding dreams—were 
interrupted after five minutes, whereas at home the sleep stage and dreams unfolded 
naturally. Studies specifically investigating the effect of the length of the REM 
period on dream affect are needed to examine the plausibility of this explanation.  
As in previous studies, it was specifically fear that was more prevalent in home, 
as compared with laboratory, dream reports (Foulkes, 1979, Studies 3 and 4; St-Onge 
et al., 2005). This helps explain why fear and anxiety are among the most frequent 
affective states in studies using home morning awakenings, especially when younger 
participants and ER are used (e.g., Hall & Van de Castle, 1996; St-Onge et al., 2005). 
Also, the sleep laboratory constitutes a safe and controlled environment, which may 
be reflected in the content of dreams. This is supported by findings showing that 
nightmares tend to occur less often in the laboratory (Spoormaker, Schredl, & van 
den Bout, 2006). 
In summary, home dream reports appear to be more affective and more negative 
than laboratory dream reports. Rather than due to the setting per se, differences in 
general affectivity seem to be mostly due to the time of night effect. Differences in 
negative affectivity may reflect true differences between settings or, alternatively, 
differences in the timing of awakenings used in the two settings. The situation is 
arguably even more complex, with the circadian (across 24 hours), ultradian 
(between and within sleep stages), and sleep-dependent (across the night) rhythms 
all interacting with each other in influencing dream content (Nielsen, 2010; 
Wamsley, 2007).  
Nevertheless, the results echo previous conclusions that typically collected home 
dream reports (i.e., obtained upon morning awakenings) represent a selective subset 
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of dreams—the most recent, affective, and negatively valenced dreams—which are 
not representative of the dreams of the whole night (Foulkes, 1979; Goodenough et 
al., 1974; Meier et al., 1968). As such, home dreams reports seem to reflect peak-
end affective experiences.  
These findings underscore the importance of considering the data collection 
environment and dream sampling procedure when collecting data and interpreting 
results. It may be difficult to generalize findings from one setting (e.g., laboratory) 
to another (e.g., home), an implication relevant to both dream and sleep research. 
Also, if we want to understand the nature (and possible function) of dream affect, we 
cannot rely solely on dreams collected upon morning awakenings. For a truly 
representative sample, we must collect dreams throughout the night (from early- and 
late-night periods), from different stages of sleep (NREM and REM), and from 
different lengths into the sleep stage. Having said this, it does not necessarily mean 
that studies conducted in one or the other setting, or based only on morning dreams, 
are of less value. What it does imply is that we must be more explicit about the limits 
of the generalizability of results obtained using such methods. 
8.2 Correlates of dream affect 
8.2.1 Dream affect and waking well-being 
Whereas Studies I and II showed that SR and ER yield different results regarding the 
phenomenology of dream affect, Study IV further demonstrated that the two 
measures are also differently associated with waking well-being and ill-being. 
Whereas ER of dream PA were positively related to peace of mind and ER of dream 
NA to symptoms of anxiety, SR of dream NA were only related to symptoms of 
anxiety. Thus, ER of dream affect are better related to waking ill- and well-being 
than SR of dream affect. 
The finding that both SR and ER of dream NA were associated with symptoms 
of anxiety provides further evidence for the better convergence of the two measures 
in the measurement of negative dream affect, as compared to the measurement of 
positive dream affect. However, ER of dream NA seem to be a stronger predictor of 
symptoms of anxiety than SR of dream NA. This may also be one explanation for 
the inconsistency of previous findings regarding the relationship between dream 
affect and anxiety. Another explanation for these inconsistencies may be that state 
and trait anxiety are differently associated with dream affect. In Study IV, state 
anxiety (i.e., symptoms of anxiety over the past two weeks) was measured. State 
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anxiety has been shown to be related to both SR and ER of dream affect (Blagrove 
et al., 2004; King & DeCicco, 2007). However, trait anxiety has been shown to be 
related to ER of dream affect (Pesant & Zadra, 2006) but not to SR of dream affect 
(Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2005; Demacheva & Zadra, 2019; Zadra & Donderi, 
2000). The problem may also lie in the trait anxiety measure itself, because the most 
commonly used questionnaire—the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970)—has been criticized for not being a pure 
anxiety measure (Bados, Gόmez-Benito, & Balaguer, 2010; Caci, Baylé, Dossios, 
Robert, & Boyer, 2003).  
Because Studies I and II showed that SR and ER do not converge in the 
measurement of dream PA, results regarding the relationship between ER of dream 
PA and peace of mind remain more uncertain. However, even if SR and ER of dream 
PA measure different aspects of the underlying construct, the results suggest that it 
may be specifically the verbal expression of affect in dream reports that reflects 
participants’ well-being and ill-being. In fact, outside of dream research, there is 
evidence that the expression of PA in waking narratives is associated with better 
mental health (Stein, Folkman, Trabasso, & Richards, 1997), physical health 
(Pennebaker & Francis, 1996), and even longevity (Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 
2001; Pressman & Cohen, 2012).  
Another issue to keep in mind is that Study IV was based on home dream reports 
collected upon morning awakenings, which, as discussed above, constitute a 
selective sample of dreams. As such, future research should investigate whether 
similar results are obtained when dream reports are collected from different times of 
night. 
Contrary to previous findings (Gilchrist et al., 2007; Schredl & Reinhard, 2009-
2010; Yu, 2007), dream affect was not found to be related to waking state affect. 
One reason for this may be that in Study IV waking affect was not measured 
continuously across the 21 days but only at one point in time (i.e., before the dream 
diary part of the study). As with the measurement of dream affect, future studies 
should measure waking affect daily, since it is, by definition, a temporary state. 
Dream affect was not associated with symptoms of depression, which corroborates 
previous findings on nonclinical samples (e.g., Pesant & Zadra, 2006) and suggests 
that this relationship may be observed only for nightmares (Zadra & Donderi, 2000) 
or in clinical populations (Schredl & Engelhardt, 2001). The finding that dream 
affect was not significantly associated with life satisfaction fits well with previous 
studies demonstrating either no (St-Onge et al., 2005) or only a weak relationship 
(Gilchrist et al., 2007) between these variables. 
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The finding that aspects of ill-being and well-being were differently related to 
dream affect implies that it is not enough to simply measure ill-being. This highlights 
the increasing acknowledgement of the distinction between ill-being and well-being 
in well-being research (Keyes, 2005; Seligman, 1999). Importantly, Study IV 
included a novel aspect of well-being—peace of mind—that had previously not been 
studied as part of a unified framework of well-being, either in dream or well-being 
research. The results regarding peace of mind have implications for both dream 
research and well-being research in demonstrating that peace of mind complements 
existing measures of well-being and helps develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of well-being and its relationship to dream affect. This is important 
because researchers have overlooked this aspect of well-being, both in dream 
research and well-being research.  
Based on the findings of this study, we also put forward a new theoretical 
proposition: whereas high levels of anxiety may reflect affect dysregulation, high 
levels of peace of mind may reflect enhanced affect regulation, across the two states 
of consciousness—waking and dreaming. As a result, individuals with anxiety 
experience more NA, but individuals with peace of mind relatively more PA, in both 
the waking and dreaming states. Future studies are needed to empirically test this 
proposition, as well as to explore whether peace of mind is empirically distinct from 
the other conceptions of well-being (i.e., HWB and EWB). 
In summary, both the method of measurement (ER vs SR) and conceptualization 
of ill-being (state vs trait anxiety) and well-being (ill-being vs well-being; different 
aspects of well-being) may explain inconsistent findings in previous studies. The 
results also demonstrate that there is (at least some) continuity between dream affect 
and waking well-being, which may rely on affect regulation ability. 
8.2.2 Neural correlates of dream affect 
Study V was the first study to investigate the relationship between discrete affective 
states in dreams and FAA and is among the few existing studies to link affective 
dream experiences—recalled and reported upon awakening—to the neural processes 
of pre-awakening sleep. 
Results showed that FAA during REM sleep—and during evening pre-sleep 
wakefulness—was related to SR of anger in REM sleep dreams. Further analyses 
demonstrated that the relationship was specifically driven by the right hemisphere: 
individuals with more alpha power (i.e., assumed to reflect less activity) in the right-
frontal cortical area experienced more anger in dreams. Although this study focused 
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mainly on SR of dream affect, SR and ER yielded similar findings regarding the 
relationship between right-frontal alpha band oscillations and anger in dreams. As 
such, this study lends further credence to our ability to more consistently measure 
NA in dreams. 
The results are in line with several findings on FAA and anger in wakefulness 
(for a review, see Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2018). Also, as in previous studies (Benca 
et al., 1999; Schmidt et al., 2003), FAA was positively correlated across wakefulness 
and REM sleep. Thus, the findings suggest that FAA is a relatively stable trait-like 
marker of affective processing that not only reflects the affective state of anger 
during REM sleep dreaming but may also be used to predict anger in REM sleep 
dreams.  
These findings have important implications for both affective neuroscience and 
dream research. In affective neuroscience there is a heated debate regarding what 
exactly FAA reflects: affective valence, approach-avoidance motivation, or 
supervisory control (e.g., Gable et al., 2018; Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2018). The 
finding that the relationship between FAA and dream affect was specific to dream 
anger (a high-approach negative affective state) but not dream interest (a high-
approach positive affective state) provides support for the supervisory control model 
of FAA (Gable et al., 2015, 2018). This seems to suggest that individuals with 
reduced activity over the right-frontal cortical areas (as evidenced by higher alpha 
power) may be less able to regulate their affective states not only in wakefulness but 
also during dreaming. This conclusion is supported by several neuroimaging, EEG, 
and brain stimulation studies demonstrating the role of the right PFC in the regulation 
of waking affect (Kim & Hamann, 2007) and in inhibitory control more generally 
(e.g., Depue, Orr, Smolker, Naaz, & Banich, 2016; Kelley et al., 2017). Although in 
Study V the results were specific to anger, this does not mean that this relationship 
necessarily holds for anger only. Because in the current sample the ratings of other 
dream affect items were low, we may have failed to detect similar relationships for 
other affective states that may require enhanced regulation (e.g., fear).  
This study also demonstrates the importance of being aware of the different 
conceptual models of affect and choosing the measures and analysis strategies 
accordingly. The results would have arguably been very different if instead of 
discrete affective states (anger and interest), different dimensions encompassing 
several discrete affects (e.g., PA vs NA; approach vs avoidance) were analysed. If 
we want to investigate the neural correlates of affect, we must decide on the 
appropriate conceptual model of affect (i.e., whether to search for the correlates of 
Discussion 
99 
discrete affective states, affective dimensions, or some other affect-related 
processes). 
Regarding dream research, the findings contribute to the accumulating evidence 
that the neural processes underlying dream experiences are shared with those of 
waking experiences (Dresler et al., 2011; Hong et al., 1996; Horikawa et al., 2013; 
Perogamvros et al., 2017; Siclari et al., 2017). Moreover, the results demonstrate that 
the neural correlates of affective processing and affect regulation are continuous 
across wakefulness and dreaming and that FAA may be one marker of such 
continuity. However, to determine the full extent of this continuity, studies that 
explore the relationship between FAA during NREM sleep and dream affect are 
needed. Moreover, it remains to be determined whether the trait-like nature of FAA 
reflects a more stable trait-like style of affective processing (e.g., trait anger, trait 
affect regulation)—individual’s affective style—across different states of 
consciousness.  
8.3 Summary and general implications of empirical 
findings 
In dream research it is generally assumed that both SR and ER accurately reflect—
and that both home and sleep laboratory dream reports give a representative picture 
of—affective dream experiences. The empirical studies of the present thesis indicate 
that these assumptions may not be warranted. The findings show that the results and 
conclusions regarding the phenomenology of dream affect differ considerably 
depending on which methods have been used to collect and analyse the data. 
Together, these findings have important theoretical and empirical implications.  
First, the discrepant findings help understand why theories of dreaming disagree 
about the frequency and nature of dream affect, such as whether dreams are 
inherently affective versus cognitive and whether they are negatively biased or not. 
Different methods yield different data regarding the same phenomenon, which can 
lead to diametrically opposite interpretations. As it stands now, it is possible to either 
confirm or refute predictions derived from an existing theory depending on which 
method is chosen for the collection and analysis of data. For example, theories that 
predict dreams to be inherently affective (e.g., random activation theories, see 
Section 4.1 for an overview of the theories) would be supported when SR of dream 
affect are used, but contradicted by ER of dream reports collected in the sleep 
laboratory, whereas the opposite would be true for theories that consider dreams to 
be mostly cognitive in nature (e.g., cognitive and neurocognitive theories). Similarly, 
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theories that predict dreams to be negatively biased (e.g., threat simulation theory, 
certain emotion processing and regulation theories) would be supported using ER of 
dream reports collected in the home environment (especially from females) but 
contradicted by SR of dream affect. The problem is that we do not know which 
method yields more trustworthy results. We have a ‘validation crisis’ (Schimmack, 
2019) in dream research: we use measures, without knowing what exactly they 
measure and how well they measure it, to make theoretical claims about dream 
affect. However, to be able to make theoretical progress—to test and develop 
different theories—we must ensure that we have methods that reflect the 
phenomenon or construct being studied as accurately and precisely as possible. 
“When measures only marginally capture intended constructs, we run a high risk of 
convicting the innocent (theory) while praising the unworthy” (Carlson & Herdman, 
2010, p. 11).  
Second, the methodological choices we make have implications for the study of 
the correlates of dream affect. Differences in study methodology, together with 
differences in how constructs are conceptualized, underlie empirical and theoretical 
disagreements regarding the associations between dream affect and other constructs, 
such as whether and to what extent dream affect is continuous with waking well-
being and what the neural correlates of dream affect are. If SR and ER measure 
different aspects of the same underlying construct—evaluations versus verbal 
expression of affective experiences—we cannot use these measures interchangeably 
and generalize findings obtained with one method only to the affective nature of 
dreams in general. Likewise, results regarding ill-being do not directly translate to 
well-being, nor do neural correlates of discrete affect to neural correlates of 
dimensional affect.  
Third, the findings of dream studies are often assumed to reflect universal 
features of dream affect. However, studies of the current thesis show that the 
plausibility of this assumption depends on the sampling of dream reports and 
participants. The content of a selective sample of dream reports, such as those 
collected upon morning awakenings, may not be representative of affective dream 
experiences as such. Similarly, the content of dream reports obtained from a selective 
sample of participants, such as female undergraduates, may not represent the 
affective dream experiences of the whole population. Although it is well 
acknowledged that differences between demographic groups, such as between 
different gender, age, and cultural groups, may affect results regarding dream affect 
(Domhoff & Schneider, 2008), most dream studies are biased towards including 
young, WEIRD female undergraduates (Kahan & Claudatos, 2016). Furthermore, as 
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demonstrated by the results of Studies IV and V, other differences between 
individuals are systematically related to dream affect, especially to affect expressed 
in dream reports.  
The existence of individual differences raises questions as to whether and to what 
extent it is possible to make general claims about the nature of dream affect, such as 
the negativity bias of dreams. The results from the current and previous studies 
suggest that the affective nature of dreams depends on the state- and trait-like 
differences between individuals; that is, it is influenced by both the circumstances of 
one’s current environment and one’s dispositions (e.g., Levin & Nielsen, 2009; 
Nielsen & Levin, 2007; Malinowski & Horton, 2015). This can be likened to 
individual differences in the negativity bias (Ito & Cacioppo, 2005; Norris, Larsen, 
Crawford, & Cacioppo, 2011) and attentional bias to threat (Öhman & Wiens, 2003) 
in wakefulness. In contrast to the prevalent assumption that the attentional bias to 
threat is universal (Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2012), evidence 
shows that such a bias is characteristic only to individuals with high levels of state 
or trait anxiety (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van 
IJzendoorn, 2007; MacLeod, Grafton, & Notebaert, 2019). In fact, healthy, non-
anxious individuals have been shown to display a positivity bias instead (Pool, 
Brosch, Delplanque, & Sander, 2016). Similarly, the negativity bias of dreams, 
particularly as expressed in dream reports, may apply only to those with high levels 
of state or trait anxiety, or to those exhibiting inefficient or maladaptive affect 
regulation. Therefore, in addition to investigating the phenomenology of affect in 
dreams in general, we must move towards understanding who, and under what 
conditions, has certain kinds of affective experiences. This also means that we must 
be careful when drawing general inferences based on selective samples.  
The results of Studies IV and V also suggest that although wakefulness and sleep 
are two distinct behavioural and neurophysiological states, the experiences we have 
in these states and their neural correlates are, at least to some extent, continuous 
across the two states. There seem to be some stable trait-like characteristics—
purportedly in affect regulation—that underlie affective experiences during 
dreaming and well-being during wakefulness, and FAA may be the neural correlate 
of this ability. As such, the findings of the current thesis provide support for theories 
that postulate cross-state continuity in the phenomenology and neural correlates of 
dream experiences (e.g., the continuity hypotheses, memory consolidation theories, 
emotion processing and regulation theories; see Section 4.1 for an overview of the 
theories). This continuity is in line with the converging views on dreaming as a 
simulation of the waking life (e.g., Foulkes, 1985; Nielsen, 2010; Revonsuo et al., 
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2016a; Windt, 2015), and suggests that subjective experiences may rely on similar 
mechanisms in wakefulness and sleep (see also De Gennaro et al., 2012; Domhoff 
& Fox, 2015; Fox et al., 2013; Wamsley, 2013). 
In summary, in addition to the methods used to collect and analyse data, 
conceptual issues and individual differences (e.g., variation in gender, affect-
relevant states and traits) may account for discrepancies in research findings. All of 
these may limit the validity, generalizability, and replicability of findings and, as a 
result, pose a challenge to theory building and theory testing. 
8.4 Limitations of empirical studies of the current 
thesis 
The studies conducted in this thesis should be considered in light of limitations that 
may have influenced the findings.  
The first limitation has to do with the representativeness of the samples. The 
samples included healthy, young Finnish and Swedish adults (mostly students). 
Hence, the studies suffer from the same methodological problem as much of dream 
research and psychological research in general—the use of convenience samples 
consisting mostly of WEIRD females (Arnett, 2008; Rad, Martingano, & Ginges, 
2018). This means that we must be careful when generalizing the findings to the 
population at large. Furthermore, relatively small sample sizes may enhance Type I 
and Type II errors, exaggerate ES, and lead to problems with replicability (Button et 
al., 2013; Forstmeier, Wagenmakers, & Parker, 2017). This is less problematic for 
within-subject comparisons (in Studies I–III) and for those findings that have been 
replicated across different samples and procedures (i.e., comparison of SR and ER 
of dream affect in Studies I–II), but it should be specifically considered when 
generalizing the results of between-subject analyses and entirely novel findings 
(such as those reported in Studies IV–V). Furthermore, several other individual 
differences not controlled for in the studies, such as alexithymia, may have 
influenced the results. 
The results may have been confounded by systematic order effects. In Study III, 
home dream reports were collected before laboratory dream reports. In Studies I, II, 
IV, and V, participants first reported their dreams and then rated the affect they 
experienced in those dreams. Regarding the latter, the dream reporting process and 
the narrative report itself may have influenced subsequent affect ratings. On the one 
hand, participants may have rated their affect based on what they believed they felt 
based on the dream storyline, rather than how they actually remembered feeling. On 
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the other hand, knowing that the report would be followed by a list of affect items, 
participants may have left those details out of the report. Studies counterbalancing 
the order of narrative reports and targeted probes can help shed light on the extent to 
which this may influence findings regarding dream affect.  
Several reporting and response biases may have influenced self-reports of dream 
experiences. In narrative dream reports, participants were asked to describe their 
dream experiences in as much detail as possible. Without more specific instructions 
regarding the reporting of dream affect, participants may have not paid attention to—
or put enough effort into—describing their affective experiences. As a result, the 
narrative dream reports may have systematically contained less affective content not 
because participants experienced less affect but because they simply reported less 
affect. Also, the reporting modality differed in the home (written reports) and 
laboratory (oral reports) environments. Although it remains to be determined 
whether the affective content of dreams is represented differently in written versus 
oral discourse, the possible influence of this must be considered.  
8.5 Looking forward: Recommendations for the study 
of dream affect 
In what follows, the conceptual and methodological issues addressed in this thesis 
are condensed into concrete recommendations for future research on dream affect. 
While it is difficult to provide general guidelines applicable to all studies, some 
common steps can be taken to improve the quality of research.  
8.5.1 Conceptual clarity and terminological consistency 
We need more clarity in how concepts (e.g., dream, affect) are defined and more 
consistency in how terms (e.g., feeling, emotion) are used. Without precise 
definitions, there is variation in what is studied and possibly even a mismatch 
between the phenomenon of interest and the construct that has been measured, 
leading to problems with validity. The inconsistent and mixed use of terms makes it 
difficult to compare results across different studies, thus undermining replicability. 
First, in addition to the conceptual definition, empirical papers should provide 
clear operational definitions of dreams and/or dreaming: whether all remembered 
and reported/rated experiences during sleep are considered dreams (A in Figure 2), 
or if only a subset of these experiences is defined as dreams (C in Figure 2), clear 
criteria should be provided regarding what count as dreamless and what as dream 
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experiences. To distinguish dreamless experiences from dream experiences, a 
fruitful approach would be to follow the minimal definition of dreaming put forward 
by Windt (2010, 2015) and use spatiotemporal self-location as an empirical criterion 
for such a distinction. Additional criteria provided by Windt et al. (2016) can be used 
to distinguish the different types of dreamless sleep experiences.  
Second, it is important to explicitly state the underlying conceptual and 
theoretical foundation of the study: which type of affective phenomenon (e.g., state 
or trait affect), which type of affective experience (e.g., emotion or mood or affective 
states in general), and which model of affect (e.g., discrete or dimensional or their 
combination) is investigated and why. This theoretical framework—rather than 
(historical) tradition or ease of application—should guide choices concerning which 
type of self-report and affect rating scale to use. Consequently, a clear rationale 
should be provided for why a certain scale (or list of items) has been chosen 
(Ekkekakis, 2013). This also means that results obtained with methods used to study 
one phenomenon, type of affective experience, and model of affect may not be 
directly comparable to results obtained with methods used to study other phenomena, 
types of affective experiences, or models of affect.  
Third, if no empirical distinction is made between emotions and moods, terms 
encompassing both concepts—such as affective states or affective feelings—should 
be used. However, distinguishing emotions from moods may prove valuable, 
because it can possibly explain at least some discrepancies in results obtained with 
SR and ER of dream affect. Currently, no agreed-upon criteria exist for making 
operational distinctions between the two types of affective states, either in dream or 
emotion research. As suggested in Sikka et al. (2017), conceptual distinctions—
intensity (i.e., high vs low), duration (i.e., short lasting vs longer lasting), and context 
(i.e., as a reaction to an object/stimulus/event vs free-floating)—can also be used as 
empirical criteria. 
8.5.2 Methodological rigour 
As discussed throughout this thesis, a host of methodological aspects can influence 
results regarding dream affect, and several methodological decisions must be made 
in the process of designing a study. Table 1 can help guide the decision-making 
process by helping researchers to consider the issues involved in each decision. 
Although the combination of methods used depends on the goals of a particular 
study, some general guidelines can be put forward (see also the “ideal reporting 
conditions” proposed by Windt, 2015, p. 196; Sikka, 2019).  
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(1) Representativeness 
Sampling strategy at both the individual and dream level—i.e., the extent to which 
the participants are representative of the target population and the collected self-
reports representative of the dream lives of the participants—should be carefully 
considered. Although a representative sample at the individual level is not feasible 
for many dream studies, the following practices, suggested by Falk et al. (2013) and 
LeWinn et al. (2017), can improve the generalizability and comparability of results. 
First, researchers should define the target population and explain to what extent the 
sample used is representative of this population. Second, the sampling and 
recruitment methods should be thoroughly reported. Third, the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the sample should be reported, ideally for all the different stages of 
the study implementation (i.e., recruitment, data collection, data analysis). 
Moreover, in addition to the commonly reported characteristics of gender and age, 
others such as ethnicity, nationality, and socioeconomic status should be reported 
(Rad et al., 2018).  
A representative sample at the dream level means that the collected data should 
represent dream experiences across both one night and several nights. This means 
that it is important to collect self-reports from different times of night, different sleep 
stages, and different lengths into sleep stages, which entails the need to use sleep 
monitoring equipment. If such sampling is not feasible, the limits of the 
generalizability of results should be explicitly stated.  
Adequate sample sizes at both the individual (number of participants) and dream 
(number of self-reports) levels are important because they enable the exploration of 
both within- and between-person variability in dream affect, something we know 
little about but which can have important implications for dream theories. This, 
however, demands careful consideration regarding the statistical analysis of the data. 
Often, such nested designs (i.e., dream reports nested within individuals) are 
neglected, and the analyses conducted at either the dream level (which confounds 
within- and between-person variability and violates the assumption of independence 
of observations) or the individual level (dream-level data are aggregated per 
participant, a practice not inherently incorrect but which overlooks within-subject or 
state-level variation). Therefore, together with adequate sample size (which ensures 
appropriate statistical power), dream studies should increasingly move towards the 
usage of multilevel modelling, which enables the simultaneous consideration of 
within- and between-person variation.  
Finally, measuring relevant state (situational) and trait (dispositional) variables, 
such as state anxiety or trait emotion regulation, enables not only to control for these 
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variables but also to explore the extent to which these variables can explain 
differences in results regarding dream affect. 
(2) Ecological validity 
For the collected data to be ecologically valid, affective dream experiences should 
be studied in a real-life environment. Therefore, naturalistic settings (i.e., home) 
should be preferred over more artificial (i.e., laboratory) environments. However, to 
avoid compromising tight experimental control and the representativeness of data, 
valid ambulatory polysomnography equipment (e.g., Ajilore, Stickgold, 
Rittenhouse, & Hobson, 1995) is needed. 
(3) Temporal proximity 
Dream experiences, particularly affective experiences, are subject to memory biases 
(e.g., Goodenough et al., 1974; Parke & Horton, 2009; Payne, 2010). Therefore, to 
study affective dream experiences (i.e., state affect), it is important to minimize the 
memory–experience gap (Miron-Shatz et al., 2009) and to have as short of a time lag 
as possible between having and reporting/rating these experiences. This means that 
self-reports of dream experiences should be obtained immediately upon awakening 
(Windt, 2015). If general beliefs or evaluations about affective dream experiences 
(i.e., trait affect) are the focus of the study, dream questionnaires should be used 
instead. 
(4) Training participants 
Because self-reports of dream experiences are subject to various biases, training the 
participants in recalling, reporting, and rating their (affective) experiences is 
increasingly emphasized (Kahan, 2012; Nielsen & Kaszniak, 2007; Nielsen & 
Stenstrom, 2005; Solomonova, Fox, & Nielsen, 2014; Stenstrom, Fox, Solomonova, 
& Nielsen, 2012; Windt, 2015). In particular, training helps participants to develop 
introspection, language, and reporting skills (i.e., how to differentiate, label, and 
report different affective states); to counteract selective reporting (i.e., to ensure that 
all details, especially regarding affective experiences, are reported) and demand 
characteristics (i.e., to ensure that participants report only those affective states that 
they actually experienced); and to help distinguish dream experiences from waking 
beliefs, expectations, and waking affect (i.e., to ensure that participants report 
affective states as they actually experienced them during the dream, whether or not 
these would normally be present or absent in similar waking life situations). At the 
same time, it is important to be aware that training as such may inadvertently 
influence the data (Windt, 2015).  
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(5) Specific instructions 
Because participants put more emphasis on reporting the dream story than how they 
feel (Kahan, 1994; Kahan & Horton, 2012), instructions specific to reporting dream 
affect are needed. However, because instructions have been shown to influence the 
results of dream content (e.g., Stern, Saayman, & Touyz, 1978), it is important to 
conduct research on the possible effect of instructions on results regarding dream 
affect (see also Schredl, 2018).  
(6) Multimethod approach 
Different data collection and analysis methods have different strengths and 
weaknesses. No method is perfect and free from measurement error. The concurrent 
use of methods helps overcome the limitations inherent in one method and make use 
of the strengths that these methods have individually. Although different researchers 
advocate some methods over others, any conclusions regarding which method to 
prefer may be premature. One important task for future research is to gain a better 
understanding of the degree of convergence and divergence of results obtained with 
different methods for collecting and analysing dream affect (e.g., SR vs ER). Only 
by using a multimethod approach can we gain a better understanding of the construct 
validity of our methods (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). In case 
of convergence, we can be more confident that our findings reflect the underlying 
dream experiences rather than stem from methodological issues. In case of 
divergence, we know to be more cautious when interpreting and generalizing our 
findings (Brewer & Hunter, 2006).  
(7) Empirically validated affect rating scales 
The use of a large number of different affect rating scales, many of which are ad hoc 
lists of items created and used by researchers for the occasion, means that it is 
difficult to compare the results of different studies. Also, the lack of the usage of 
empirically validated scales and the lack of information regarding the psychometric 
properties of the scales contribute to the ‘validity crisis’ (Schimmack, 2019). Hence, 
it is important to evaluate the psychometric properties of the scales used to measure 
dream affect, and when choosing which scale to use, to prefer psychometrically 
strongest scales (Ekkekakis, 2013). Also, more research is needed to adapt or 
develop scales that can be used for the measurement of affect across the different 
states of consciousness (i.e., dreaming and wakefulness). Last but not least, the same 
(set of) empirically validated scales should be consistently used across different 
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studies to be able to draw broad and generalizable conclusions (Weidman et al., 
2017). 
(8) Dream episode as a unit of analysis 
As discussed previously, global SR of dream affect—ratings of the dream experience 
as a whole—may be biased due to the aggregation processes. Similarly, ER based 
on the coding of each and every affective state expressed in the dream report may 
also involve biases: it may well be that the same affective state has been expressed 
several times not because it was experienced repeatedly but because participants 
referred to the same experience repeatedly. Therefore, to account for these possible 
biases, one solution is to divide the dream report into a sequence of episodes that are 
then rated using a particular affect rating scale. This would be similar to the 
continuous moment-by-moment analysis (known as cued review; Rosenberg & 
Ekman, 1994) used in emotion research. Upon reporting the dream, the dreamer goes 
through the dream experience (or report) so that the temporal dimension of the 
original experience is ‘replayed’ during the rating procedure (Larsen & Fredrickson, 
1999). This not only helps to ground the ratings on the ‘actual’ remembered events 
but enables the application of the operational criteria for distinguishing emotions 
from moods, by marking the duration (beginning and end of an affective episode), 
intensity, and cause/context of the affective state. External judges could then rate the 
same episodes using the same scale as the dreamers. Although a similar approach 
has been previously used (Nielsen et al., 1991), due to the scarcity of research, this 
recommendation should be taken as a suggestion for future research.  
(9) Measuring waking affect in conjunction with dream affect 
Including the measurement of waking affect, together with dream affect, would serve 
several purposes: it would help (a) validate our methods of dream affect 
measurement, (b) explore the continuity of affect across different states of 
consciousness, and (c) provide a baseline with which to compare data regarding 
dream affect (see also Kahan & Claudatos, 2016; Kahan & Horton 2012; Revonsuo 
et al., 2016a). Because it is debatable whether the appropriate comparison condition 
for dream experiences would involve waking life events or waking imagination 
(mind-wandering or daydreaming), it is important to measure affect across the 
different waking states. 
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8.5.3 Interdisciplinary approach 
The study of dream affect has been somewhat isolated from other scientific fields 
and research areas. Progress in understanding dream affect would be enhanced if we 
better integrated dream research with other areas of research, such as emotion, well-
being, and consciousness research. On the one hand, dream research would benefit 
from the knowledge and methods obtained and developed in other fields. For 
example, emotion and well-being research can provide psychometrically validated 
measures of affect or well-being, something that has been underemployed in dream 
research. On the other hand, the study of affective experiences during dreaming 
complements our understanding of waking experiences. In fact, because dream 
experiences are largely isolated from environmental influences and motor behaviour, 
they may provide a unique window into the ‘pure’ subjective experiences of affect. 
Therefore, the study of dream affect can help inform ongoing empirical and 
theoretical debates in other fields regarding, for example, the neural correlates of 
affective experiences (e.g., Hamann, 2018; Kragel & LaBar, 2016) and the role of 
physiological feelings in the conscious experience of affect (e.g., Pace-Schott et al., 
2019). 
8.5.4 Theoretical progress 
A multitude of dream theories exist which differ in their explanations regarding the 
nature, function, and correlates of affect experienced in dreams. Such explanatory 
pluralism, as it is called in the philosophy of science (Van Bouwel, 2014), can be 
taken to reflect the immaturity of the field (Kuhn, 1962), the complexity of the 
phenomenon under investigation (Mitchell, 2003), or considered necessary for 
scientific progress to occur (Popper, 1962). Regardless of the underlying cause of 
plurality, the question is how to move dream science forward theoretically. 
Theoretical progress refers to “progress scientists make (or possibly could make) 
with theories” (Saatsi, 2019, p. 612). As in empirical dream research, dream theories 
would benefit from enhanced conceptual clarity: precise definitions of the 
phenomena (i.e., whether theories apply to dreams in the broader or narrower sense, 
to affective experiences in general or to emotions in particular) would help elucidate 
points of convergence and divergence between the various theories.  
Further, given the plurality of theories, rather than coming up with ever more 
theories, effort should be put into systematically testing existing theories. Testing 
implies that we derive specific hypotheses and predictions from the theory that can 
then be potentially falsified (i.e., shown to be false) (Stanovich, 2010). However, the 
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problem with several dream theories is that they are rather vague, imprecise, and 
have not put forward falsifiable propositions (Revonsuo, Tuominen, & Valli, 2016b). 
Therefore, we need to clarify existing theories, and formulate testable hypotheses 
(from competing theories) that can then be repeatedly tested using valid and reliable 
methods. Theories that survive falsification are supported, at least for the time being. 
Theories that are falsified may need to be modified or discarded altogether (Popper, 
1959). “Thus, it is by theory adjustment caused by falsified predictions that sciences 
such as psychology get closer to the truth” (Stanovich, 2010, p. 34).  
However, the falsification of theory-driven hypotheses does not necessarily 
mean that the theory is incorrect. It is likely that the particular theory applies under 
certain conditions, but not under other circumstances. For example, theories 
predicting the dominance of negative affectivity in dreams may apply to individuals 
who have an increased disposition to negative affectivity and who are subjected to 
stressful life events. Therefore, it is important to establish the boundary conditions 
of theories, that is, to specify the conditions under which the theory is applicable 
(i.e., who, where, when) (Busse, Kach, & Wagner, 2017). 
Over time, the repeated empirical testing of theories will show whether some 
theories have more explanatory power over others, or whether the unification of 
(some of) those will lead to a stronger theory (with more explanatory and predictive 
power). Hence, the progress of (dream) science depends on our ability to derive 
empirically testable hypotheses from (rival) theories (Revonsuo et al., 2016b) and 
on having valid methods to test those hypotheses. In this sense, theoretical progress 
goes hand in hand with methodological rigour and empirical progress. 
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9. Conclusion 
Different dream theories and empirical findings agree that our dreams contain 
affective experiences, but they disagree about the frequency, nature, and correlates 
of these experiences. In this thesis, I have shown that these disagreements stem from 
several conceptual and methodological issues in the study of dream affect.  
The empirical studies conducted in the framework of this thesis demonstrate that 
different methods for collecting and analysing data can lead to very different results 
and conclusions regarding the phenomenology of dream affect. Whether dreams 
appear to be mostly affective or non-affective, negatively biased or not, and how 
frequently fear seems to be experienced in dreams, depends on whether dream 
reports have been collected using sleep laboratory awakenings or home dream diaries 
(Study III) and whether dream affect has been measured using SR or ER (Studies I–
II). In addition, several individual differences, such as gender, affect-related states 
and traits, contribute to differences in results regarding the affective nature of dreams 
(Studies II, IV, and V). Because SR and ER yield different results regarding the 
phenomenology of dream affect, they are also differently correlated with other 
constructs such as waking well-being (Study IV). This applies especially to positive 
dream affect. As SR and ER converge better in the measurement of negative dream 
affect, findings regarding the correlates of NA in dreams are more consistent and 
reliable (Studies IV–V). Together, these results call for caution in making broad 
generalizations about affective dream experiences as such based on studies that use 
only one type of data collection and analysis measures, and that are based on 
selective samples of dream reports and participants. 
The results also demonstrate that ER of dream affect are related to aspects of 
waking well-being and ill-being—peace of mind and symptoms of anxiety, 
respectively (Study IV)—and that certain discrete affective states in dreams, 
specifically anger, rely on similar neural processes as in wakefulness (Study V). 
These novel findings suggest that there is cross-state continuity with regard to both 
the phenomenology and the underlying neural processes of affective experiences. 
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This continuity may rely on the ability of affect regulation, the neural marker of 
which may be FAA.  
This thesis contributes to dream research and theory by calling for the need—
and suggesting ways—to enhance the conceptual clarity and methodological rigour 
of research on (affective) dream experiences. Only precise definitions of constructs, 
and reliable and valid methods to measure them, enable us to replicate results and 
draw accurate conclusions. Theories, thus, are only as good as the methods we use. 
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the thesis, the contributions extend beyond 
dream research. Specifically, this thesis contributes to the following:  
(a) emotion research, as well as to other areas within and outside psychological 
science (e.g., medicine, linguistics) that use SR and ER of affect, by highlighting 
problems with and encouraging more research on the convergent validity of these 
measures;  
(b) sleep research, by showing the limits of the generalizability of data collected in 
one setting only (e.g., at home vs in the sleep laboratory);  
(c) well-being research, by drawing attention to a novel aspect of well-being—peace 
of mind—that has been neglected in the current framework of well-being;  
(d) affective neuroscience, by demonstrating the continuity of affect-related neural 
processes, such as FAA, across different states of consciousness, and by providing 
evidence for the supervisory control model of FAA; and 
(e) consciousness research, by discussing what to consider when studying the 
phenomenology and correlates of subjective experiences (of affect).  
To conclude, although we still do not know why we have (affective) dream 
experiences, knowing the what (it is that we study) and how (to measure it) will put 
us on the right path towards answering this question. 
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